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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the significant governance challenges that
arise during responses to public health emergencies and proposes a
new multifaceted strategy-integrated pluralistic governance-to
address these challenges. Emergency preparedness is an inherently
complex problem that entails the integration ofscientific and medical
expertise, good logistical planning, and clear laws and policies. The
governance function has particular import for public health
emergencies because pandemics, hurricanes, and other disasters can
have profoundly divisive social and political consequences.
Moreover, recent disasters like Hurricane Katrina and the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill revealed an emergency preparedness and
response infrastructure in the United States that was broken: starved
of necessary resources, beset by problems at all levels of government,
and undermined by poor decision making at each of these levels.
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Governance theories are particularly relevant to addressing the
challenges posed by public health emergencies because these theories
can help to explain and shape outcomes within complex systems. This
Article delineates and explores three categories of governance
models: traditional governance models, New Governance models,
and diffuse governance models. These models provide insight into
existing efforts to govern public health emergencies within and
outside of formal emergency response systems and highlight
unexplored avenues for strengthening these systems. Integrated
pluralistic governance adopts aspects of all three governance models
and encourages the development of concurrency, coordination, and
redundancy to create a more effective and resilient public health
emergency response system.
INTRODUCTION
P ublic health emergencies have cast a long shadow over the firstdecade of the twenty-first century. During these years, infectious
diseases, natural disasters, and intentional attacks have persistently
arisen to endanger the health and well-being of populations in the
United States and around the world. Novel threats to the public's
health emerged from many sources throughout the decade, beginning
with the high-profile damage and loss of life caused by the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the ensuing release
2
of anthrax spores via the United States Postal Service. Devastating
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 278-323 (2004) (describing the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and response). Though not all terrorist attacks can be considered public health
emergencies, the September 11 attacks and other large-scale potential attacks can have
significant public health impacts. Additionally, public fears of terroristic threats to health
have been exacerbated by spectacular terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, Beslan,
and Mumbai. See generally ANGEL RABASA ET AL., THE LESSONS OF MUMBAI (2009),
http://www.google.com/url?sa-t&rct-j&q=&esrc=s&source-web&cd=l&ved=OCCEQFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rand.org%2Fpubs%2Foccasional-papers%2F2009%2
FRANDOP249.pdf&ei=5lyLUI2NE6KeiALYulDoCQ&usg-AFQjCNElOOyBJr3FPtcZ
HzXUylvHWVw9bg&sig2=06ZiUp2Oj63-JHGiS4QHlg (2008 Mumbai attacks); H.M.
CORNONER, CORONER'S INQUEST INTO THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7 JULY 2005 1-65
(May 6, 2011), http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf
(2005 London bombings); Dov Lynch, 'The enemy is at the gate':. Russia after Beslan, 81
INT'L AFF. 141, 141-61 (2005) (footnote omitted) (2004 Beslan siege); J Peral-Gutierrez
de Ceballos et al., Review: 11 March 2004: The Terrorist Bomb Explosions in Madrid,
Spain - An Analysis of the Logistics, Injuries Sustained and Clinical Management of
Casualties Treated at the Closest Hospital, 9 CRITICAL CARE 104, 104-11 (2005) (2004
Madrid bombings); Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, Bali Bombings Kill at Least 25 in
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natural disasters instigated widespread destruction though a variety of
means ranging from earthquakes to hurricanes to tsunamis to floods.3
The appearance of infectious diseases such as Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and new strains of influenza
threatened to kill and harm people across the globe.
These recent public health emergencies stand out from prior events
in part due to the magnitude of their actual and potential negative
impact on the public's health and in part for what they have revealed
about the capacity of our systems to respond. Hurricane Katrina and
its aftermath revealed an emergency preparedness and response
infrastructure in the United States that was broken: starved of
necessary resources, beset by problems at all levels of government,
and undermined by poor decision making at each of these levels.4 The
Tourist Spots, N.Y. TIMES: INT'L (Oct. 2, 2005), http://travel.nytimes.com/2005/10/02
/intemational/asia/02bali.htmlpagewanted=all&r-0 (2005 Bali bombings).
3 The most notable natural disasters of the decade include the December 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States in September 2005, the Haitian
and Chilean Earthquakes of early 2010, the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and radiation
release in 2011, and Superstorm Sandy in the United States in 2012. Beyond these events,
the United States experienced a number of additional strong hurricanes, floods, and
wildfires during this time period. Worldwide, additional devastating earthquakes occurred
in Iran in 2006, China in 2008, and New Zealand in 2011. Floods associated with Cyclone
Nargis killed thousands in Myanmar, and massive flooding caused substantial destruction
in Pakistan, Australia, and Brazil.
4 See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-06-32, A
PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA's DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE
To HURRICANE KATRINA 18-65 (Mar. 2006), www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig-06
-32_mar06.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA] (assessing the successes
and failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and providing recommendations for
improvement); Thomas Birkland & Sarah Waterman, Is Federalism the Reason for Policy
Failure in Hurricane Katrina?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 692, 705-10 (2008)
(concluding that "homeland security" focus reduced federal support for natural disaster
preparedness and eroded response capacity during Hurricane Katrina); Erin Ryan, How the
New Federalism Failed Katrina Victims, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER:
HURRICANE KATRINA 173, 201-11 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) (finding that both
federal and state government failed in their Hurricane Katrina response). Responsible for
over 1,800 deaths, Hurricane Katrina was the deadliest hurricane in seventy-seven years.
RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT:
HURRICANE KATRINA 11 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina
.pdf (last updated Aug. 2006 & Sept. 2011). The same 2005 hurricane season brought
Hurricane Rita, a Category 5 storm causing one of the largest evacuations in U.S. history
with a storm surge that destroyed entire coastal communities of Louisiana with an
estimated twelve billion dollars in overall damages. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L
HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 8 (2006),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-ALl82005_Rita.pdf (last updated Sept. 2011). It also
brought Hurricane Wilma, which caused the "largest disruption to electrical service ever
experienced in Florida." RICHARD J. PASCH ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL
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rapid spread of novel HINI influenza around the world in 2009 and
2010 showed that, despite years of planning, many of our institutions
remain underprepared to quickly and effectively react to an emerging
infectious disease that had been widely anticipated.s The 2010 BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the Fukushima
radiation release in Japan following its 2011 earthquake and tsunami
demonstrated that technological and political limitations can impede
6the resolution of serious threats to public health.
Events like these remind us of the destructive potential of natural
events on human health and well-being. They also highlight the
capacity of technology to foster risks of harm to health, whether
wielded for beneficial, neutral, or malevolent purposes. Since
additional significant health threats from infectious diseases and
natural disasters surely will emerge in the future, whether naturally
occurring or intentionally instigated, these factors reveal quite starkly
the continuing need for effective governance of public health
emergencies.
The success or failure of the response to a public health emergency
relies on mechanisms and contingencies that are astoundingly
complex. Complex systems involved in a multijurisdictional,
multisectoral public health emergency response often successfully
minimize the harmful impact of health threats.7 Nevertheless, when
these complex systems fail, they often fail in complex ways, eluding
easy remedies to diagnose and solve the problems that led to the
failure.8
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE WILMA 5 (2006), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf /TCR-AL
252005_Wilma.pdf (last updated Sept. 2006).
5 See Lance Gable et al., Public Health Legal Responses to H1N1, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 46 (2011) (exploring the public health legal responses to
the HINI pandemic).
6 See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1105-07 (2011) (discussing how political overlap and
fragmentation can impede efficiency in the event of a disaster); Daniel Kaufmann &
Veronika Penciakova, Opinion, Japan's Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake,
Tsunami and Nuclear Crises, BROOKINGS: RESEARCH (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www
.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/16-japan-disaster-kaufmann (discussing how
Japan's response to the nuclear power plant crisis was subpar, reflecting shortcomings in
leadership and governance).
7 See J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 890-901
(2008).
8 Id. at 907.
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Hurricane Katrina, the most obvious and egregious failure of
public health emergency response in recent American history,
exemplifies this complexity. The breakdown of the Hurricane Katrina
response stemmed from multiple factors. Deficiencies in the design of
the logistical and legal systems for public health emergency response
resulted in poor emergency planning, inadequate clarity of key
aspects of applicable law and policy, and political gridlock.9 Further,
operational deficiencies arose in the system stemming from
insufficient systemic capacity, poor decision making at multiple
levels of government, and lackluster implementation of existing
emergency plans.1 o
Improving and strengthening public health emergency response
systems in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina has proved a daunting
task that has preoccupied lawmakers, policymakers, health
professionals, and scholars alike." Law and policy debates
addressing public health emergencies have most often focused on
questions of power allocation between government entities or the
structural composition of the formal (i.e., legally prescribed,
9 See infra Part II.C.1.
10 See infra Part II.C.2.
I1 See generally COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 585-630
(2005), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?browsePath=109/SRPT/[300
%3b]&granuleld=CRPT- 109srpt322&packageld=CRPT- 109srpt322 [hereinafter
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED] (analyzing the Hurricane Katrina
response and making recommendations for improvement); PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF
FEMA, supra note 4, at 18-65 (assessing the successes and failures of the Hurricane
Katrina response and providing recommendations for improvement); THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 51-82 (2006),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/ [hereinafter
LESSONS LEARNED] (providing a list of lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina
response and suggesting improvements to the federal system); THOMAS A. BIRKLAND,
LESSONS OF DISASTER: POLICY CHANGE AFTER CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 157-89 (2006)
(describing lessons learned and unlearned during the Hurricane Katrina disaster response);
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 522-39 (2007) (describing the impact
of federalism on the Hurricane Katrina response). See generally LAW AND RECOVERY
FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) (analysis and
recommendations related to improving disaster response); JOHN MCQUAID & MARK
SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE
COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS (2006) (describing the events leading to, and the political
and policy aftermath of, Hurricane Katrina); ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (analysis of Hurricane Katrina
and recommendations to improve disaster response).
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government-led) chain of authority during an emergency response.12
Questions of how the governance of public health emergencies can be
orchestrated more broadly-taking into account the concurrent
activities and capacities of multiple governmental and
nongovernmental actors-have received much less examination.
The overwhelming emphasis on solidifying and strengthening the
government-led aspects of emergency response raises two concerns.
First, the presumption that government activities and traditional,
centralized "command-and-control" organizational schemes form the
only reasonable model for emergency response fails to consider the
important contributions of actors outside the formal system to
successful emergency response efforts. A successful public health
emergency response often involves marshaling a much broader set of
inputs and actors to work in concert with the government sphere.
Nongovernmental participants in emergency response may include
volunteers, nongovernmental organizations, private sector institutions,
and community members. Second, this emphasis similarly
disregards options for improving the governance of public health
emergencies that extend beyond the scope of these formal systems.
Overreliance on the operation of formal emergency response systems
can leave these systems vulnerable to failure when specific decision
12 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the
21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 45-54 (2003) (criticizing the use of emergency
legal powers by state governments during public health emergencies); Lawrence 0.
Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and
Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF. 79, 86-91 (2002) [hereinafter Gostin, Public Health
Law in an Age of Terrorism] (defending the use of emergency legal powers by state
governments during public health emergencies).
13 See JAMES F. MISKEL, DISASTER RESPONSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT
WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T 17-18 (2006) (describing the integral role of nonprofit volunteer
organizations including the Red Cross in disaster response); James G. Hodge, Jr., et al.,
The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health
Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5, 13-14 (2005) [hereinafter Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting
Surge Capacity] (discussing the importance of volunteers in meeting surge capacity needs
during public health emergencies); Sharona Hoffman, Responders' Responsibility:
Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1918-19 (2008)
(describing a range of private-sector professionals, including volunteers, who may be
necessary to medical response during public health emergencies); Gabor D. Kelen &
Melissa L. McCarthy, The Science of Surge, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1089, 1090-91
(2006) (detailing the role of hospitals and the concept of hospital surge capacity during
catastrophic events); Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Community Engagement: Leadership
Tool for Catastrophic Health Events, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 8, 11-21 (2007)
(highlighting the role of community members in successful emergency response efforts).
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makers neglect to make good decisions or execute their discretion
ineffectively, as was the case during Hurricane Katrina.
Governance theories are particularly relevant to addressing the
challenges posed by public health emergencies because these theories
can help to explain and shape outcomes within complex systems.
Governance encompasses the activities, functions, and exercises of
management, influence, and control that may be applied to achieve
designated ends within a system. Nonetheless, a clear understanding
of governance of public health emergencies remains elusive and
incomplete. This Article delineates and explores three categories of
governance models: traditional governance models, New Governance
models, and diffuse governance models. 14 Not only do these models
provide insight into existing efforts to govern public health
emergencies within and outside of formal emergency response
systems, they also highlight unexplored avenues for strengthening
these systems.
This Article proposes implementing a novel strategy of integrated
pluralistic governance to improve health outcomes during public
health emergencies. Integrated pluralistic governance adopts aspects
of all three governance models and encourages the development of a
redundant governance infrastructure to foster resiliency and
adaptability during public health emergency responses. In other
words, the mechanisms in place to respond to public health
emergencies should be both pluralistic in that they employ several
different governance models simultaneously, and integrated in that
these models are coordinated, or at least complementary, to the extent
possible. This strategy has two inherent advantages for effective
public health emergency response. First, integrated pluralistic
governance recognizes the benefits of different governance models
and encourages strengthening multiple models concurrently, while
14 See discussion infra Part III.
15 While redundancy often is characterized as an inherently negative concept reflecting
waste and inefficiency, I hope to deconstruct this understanding. In some circumstances,
redundancy across systems can promote innovation, protect rights, and help improve legal
and social norms. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest,
Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 645-46, 661 (1981) [hereinafter
Cover, Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy] (showing that jurisdictional redundancy of
parallel legal forums leads to better outcomes by allowing for the creation of new norms
and permitting litigants to avoid corrupt judges). See also Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1044-46 (1977) [hereinafter Cover, Dialectical Federalism] (discussing the
potential benefits of redundancy in the multilayered jurisdiction created by habeas corpus
petitions).
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providing resiliency to counter the weaknesses of each respective
governance model. Second, the strategy creates a redundant
infrastructure that can circumvent governance failures when they arise
and achieve good health outcomes despite these failures.
The application of concurrent governance models through an
integrated pluralistic governance strategy can avoid failures in the
public health emergency response system if one governance strategy
breaks down or moves too slowly, as the formal chain of command
did during Hurricane Katrina. Integration of these governance models
could lead to greater effectiveness, transparency, coordination, and
synergy of effort in public health emergency response. Deploying
varying governance models can also potentially minimize
interjurisdictional and interinstitutional conflict during public health
emergencies by more completely mapping the relationships between
different participants in emergency governance and resolving their
respective roles, strategies, and inconsistencies.16 Care must be
exercised to insure that inconsistencies and power struggles across the
different governance models do not undermine the resiliency created
through the integrated pluralistic governance strategy.
This Article explores and develops models of public health
emergency governance in detail, focusing on the response phase of
the emergency.17 Part II of the Article identifies a number of core
challenges for public health emergency governance. This discussion
underscores the logistical and legal complexity of public health
emergencies, the threats that these emergencies pose to population
health, and the potential for governance failures within the emergency
response system, particularly when the system is faced with a
catastrophic emergency like Hurricane Katrina. Part III of the Article
provides an extensive overview of three models of governance and
16 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1768-69 (1995) (discussing how members of society achieve a level of mutual respect
even when they cannot come to a consensus on the content of policy issues); see also
GRIFFIN TROTTER, THE ETHICS OF COERCION IN MASS CASUALTY MEDICINE 40, 51-52
(2007) (applying modus vivendi theory-the idea that parties will not reach a consensus,
but rather work together "in spite of intractable differences"-to decision making during
public health emergencies); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Health Care, and Incompletely
Theorized Agreements: A Normative Theory of Health Policy Decision Making, 32 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 51, 51-52 (2007) (asserting a normative theory for analyzing
health policy and observing "that unarticulated values and norms have a critical role to
play in health-policy making and reform").
17 The phases of emergency response are typically divided into four categories:
preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery. See 6 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2006).
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situates public health emergencies within the context of each model.
This discussion compares the three governance models and assesses
governance of public health emergencies according to metrics of
government control and centralization. Part IV synthesizes these
concepts and makes the case that public health emergency governance
can be improved through the application of the innovative strategy of
integrated pluralistic governance. This section considers the strengths
and weaknesses of the three governance models and demonstrates that
an integrated pluralistic governance approach can use aspects of each
model in creating a more robust and resilient public health emergency
response system built on notions of concurrency, coordination, and
redundancy. This section additionally explores the challenges that
redundancy and hierarchy pose to public health emergency
governance models, and the contributions and limitations of law in
addressing complex challenges inherent to public health emergency
governance. Despite these challenges, integrated pluralistic
governance strategies are vital to avoiding systemic failures when
dangerous public health emergencies arise and threaten health.
I
CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE
A. Defining Public Health Emergency Governance
Models of governance describe efforts to influence or exert control
over events and outcomes within a system.1 Several key aspects
typify the concept of governance: (1) efforts to manage or control
events; (2) participation by a multiplicity of actors and institutions;
(3) use of different methods and tools to achieve governance goals;
(4) a need to comprehend and navigate multiple intersecting systems
and priorities that shape the architecture of governance; and (5)
consideration of a range of normative goals, whether political, social,
*19
or economic.
18 See Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 335,
336 (2004) [hereinafter Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health] (defining
governance as "the management of the course of events in a system"); Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 344 (2004) (defining governance as "the range of
activities, functions, and exercise of control by both public and private actors in the
promotion of social, political, and economic ends").
19 Definitions of governance abound within the scholarly literature and cover a wide
range of variations on the themes outlined in this section. See generally John Braithwaite
et al., Can Regulation and Governance Make a Difference?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1
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Assessing models of "governance," rather than models of
"government" or "regulation," may have significant implications for
how we understand systems and the effect of law and other factors on
outcomes in complex systems. The rise in attention to the concept of
governance in academic and policy circles, therefore, has importance
since it may represent a paradigm movement toward applying a
broader perspective on how actions affect outcomes in complex social
systems. In the public health emergency context, governance involves
looking at the entirety of the systems and participants relevant to
public health emergencies and evaluating them as a complex and
interrelated whole rather than as discrete subcomponents.
The semantic distinction between governance and regulation merits
attention. Historically, discussions of regulation focused on efforts by
the government to authorize or limit events or behavior.2 0 The shift to
discussing governance rather than regulation coincided with the
recognition by scholars and policymakers of a more involved role of
external, non-state actors in the management of events or behaviors,
essentially expanding the notion of regulation beyond the state.2 1
While some commentators continue to use the terms governance and
regulation interchangeably, the two concepts may be differentiated by
their scope and breadth. Governance is a broader concept than
regulation, encompassing all of the actors and tools that may
participate in managing events within a system.2 2 Regulation
comprises a subset of governance, as the set of law-based tools
designed to affect "the flow of events and behavior" but not
(2007) (introducing a new journal focusing on regulation and governance, and explaining
its priorities and interests); Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-
Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Burris, Changes in Governance] (providing detailed discussion and citations for
definitions of governance).
20 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 7-16 (1992) (discussing contemporary trends and theories in
regulation and deregulation).
21 See Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 139 (2008) [hereinafter
Black, Polycentric Regulatory Regimes] (defining regulation as "sustained and focused
attempts to change the behavior of others in order to address a collective problem or attain
an identified end or ends, usually through a combination of rules or norms and some
means for their implementation and enforcement, which can be legal or non-legal").
22 See Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL.
1, 29-34 (2002) (finding that regulation is a less broad concept than governance).
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necessarily providing and distributing activities. Thus, governance
of public health emergencies entails all of the activities, functions,
and exercises of management, influence, and control that may be
applied to achieve designated ends during a public health emergency.
Institutions of government traditionally have been the primary
actors in governance generally and in the governance of public health
in particular. Indeed, the population-level goals of public health often
demand the strong participation of government in order to function, as
the private sector takes insufficient interest in the collective health
24goals necessary to protect and improve public health. Local
government officials and institutions have taken a direct role in
governing public health throughout the history of the United States.25
Over time, the governance of public health was transformed from a
set of actions within the discrete purview of local governments to a
more complex system incorporating substantial state and federal
26
regulatory efforts. State participation in public health was integral to
the expansion of public health practice, particularly given the broadly
recognized constitutional authority of the states to utilize their police
27powers to protect the public's health. Federal involvement in public
health practices began expanding in the latter half of the twentieth
century, mirroring the augmentation of federal powers and
proliferation of federal institutions and administrative regulations that
28
accompanied the rise of the administrative state more generally.
The expanding jurisdictional interest in public health governance
accompanied a contemporaneous pluralization in the nature of the
participants involved in public health activities. As the complexity of
health threats increased and the scope of challenges to public health
expanded, various nongovernmental actors became involved in efforts
to manage and attempt to control outcomes in the face of threats to
23 Braithwaite et al., supra note 19, at 3 (contrasting the scope of regulation and
governance as concepts).
24 See LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2d
ed., 2008) (recognizing the primary role of government in protecting the public's health)
[hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT].
25 See id. at 150-51.
26 See id. at 155-65.
27 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905) (upholding state police
powers to require compulsory smallpox vaccinations).
28 See GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT, supra note 24, at 147-65 (detailing the
historical development of public health governance).
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health, oftentimes under the explicit or implicit direction of the
government.2 9
This expanded community, together with traditional government
actors, has led to the development of a modem, multifaceted public
health system. The Institute of Medicine has recognized that the U.S.
health system is comprised of numerous sectors and participants,
including government agencies, the clinical care delivery system,
employers and businesses, the media, the education sector, and
members of the public.3 0 Moreover, each of these sectors operates
within its own legal environment, subject to numerous, distinct legal
obligations and standards. Despite the more extensive diversification
of actors involved in public health governance, however, government
institutions at all levels continue to play an integral role in the
governance of public health and take a particularly prominent role in
the governance of public health emergencies.
The application of governance as a conceptual model for assessing
systemic functioning can generate novel ideas for strengthening
public health systems. By contemplating and attempting to understand
the complex, multifaceted relationships between actors, institutions,
methodologies, and outcomes in the context of public health
emergencies, we may glean new insights into the factors that truly
affect outcomes under these circumstances. If we can avoid
piecemeal, fragmented approaches to assessing public health
emergency response and consider instead the larger systemic
framework at hand, there is a chance to better comprehend and impact
how this system is governed.3 '
B. Complexity and Public Health Emergency Governance
Governance of public health emergencies presents a series of
formidable challenges, many of which arise from the complexity of
the relevant systems and the effects of public health emergencies. Yet,
the application of governance models-which can provide context to
29 See id. at 155-65.
30 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND
POLICY TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES 27-33 (2011) (describing the structure and
participants in the health system in the United States).
31 There is always some danger in trying to assess whole systems or to believe that we
can engineer these systems to produce the outcomes we seek. Burris, Governance,
Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 336-37 (noting that moving health policy
towards a governance approach is not a panacea, and urging humility in engaging in the
difficult task of trying to manage a complex system toward specific ends).
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understand complex systems-to public health emergencies has not
been extensively explored and remains undertheorized. In particular,
extant legal scholarship in the field often does not address the broader
systemic issues raised by governance approaches or apply the ideas
32being proposed by governance scholars in other disciplines. To the
extent that legal scholars have devoted sustained attention to health
governance models, most have explored the fields of global health33
and healthcare.3 4 However, the urgency and potential novelty
engendered by public health emergencies-particularly during the
response phase when rapid actions are required to minimize loss of
life-are unlike situations examined in these other areas of health
governance, which typically assess governance in less urgent
circumstances.35
There are several compelling reasons to apply governance theories
to public health emergencies. Governance allows for a more
sophisticated look at the systemic factors that apply to outcomes
during public health emergencies, such as legal systems, allocations
of authority, organization and prioritization of resources, logistical
challenges, and application of expertise. Governance theories
additionally may explain how different actors and actions fit together
32 But see Nan D. Hunter, "Public-Private" Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 89, 103-09 (2007) [hereinafter Hunter, "Public
Private" Health Law] (discussing the growing body of new governance trends in public
health law and policy).
33 See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Global Health Jurisprudence: A Time of Reckoning, 96
GEO. L.J 393, 394-95 (2008) (describing the rise of global health governance through
global health jurisprudence); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the
World's Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96
GEO. L.J. 331, 383-91 (2008) (recommending the creation of a Framework Convention on
Global Health). See generally GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: HEALTH ECONOMIC
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES (Richard D. Smith et al. eds., 2003) (examining the
globalization of health through "public goods" theory).
34 Scholars have applied governance models to aspects of the health care system and the
medical research infrastructure in the United States. See Scott Burris, Regulatory
Innovation in the Governance of Human Subjects Research: A Cautionary Tale and Some
Modest Proposals, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 65 (2008); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance
and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1 (2008); Joseph V. Rees, The
Orderly Use of Experience: Pragmatism and the Development of Hospital Industry Self-
Regulation, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 9 (2008).
35 See Fidler, supra note 33, at 397-98 (noting the unprecedented cross-sector
cooperation necessitated by public health emergencies); see also Scott Burris et al., Nodal
Governance, 30 AUSTLALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 30 (2005) [hereinafter Burris, Nodal
Governance] (proposing a nodal governance approach to improve health in a
nonemergency context); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care
Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 146-50 (2006) (assessing new governance
approaches to everyday health care systems).
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within the entirety of the public health emergency context, as well as
the methods, institutions, and legal or normative regimes that may
empower or constrain these actions. This insight is vital to improving
results during public health emergency responses. The failures of the
Hurricane Katrina response, for example, hinged on both systemic
problems (poor design of emergency response systems) and
operational problems (poor execution of emergency response plans)
36in the government-led response efforts. Application of governance
theories also may provide new ideas for public health emergency
preparedness and response or may challenge existing orthodoxies in
these areas. In short, broadly assessing how public health emergencies
are governed, rather than merely how they are regulated by law or
influenced by specific plans or provisions, provides an opportunity to
create a more useful, comprehensive, and adaptable framework to
address emergency circumstances. Moreover, approaching these
problems as governance problems can allow law- and policymakers to
reconsider the potential roles that law can play as a component of a
37
system of governance.
1. Logistical Complexity in Public Health Emergency Governance
Public health emergencies are among the most complex situations
to govern given the social disruption, impact on health, and
extraordinary circumstances that often surround such emergencies.
38Events that meet the definition of a public health emergency
36 See infra Part II.C for more discussion of systemic and operational failures generally
and during Hurricane Katrina.
37 On this issue, I concur with Professor Nan Hunter's observation that "public health
law offers the opportunity to study the interaction of varying models of governance as they
develop, in real time." Hunter, supra note 32, at 119.
38 Legal definitions of "public health emergency" at both the federal and state levels
concur with this distinction between emergency and normal circumstances. The federal
Public Health Service Act defines a public health emergency as "a disease or disorder ...
including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks." 42 U.S.C. §
247d(a) (2006). A more descriptive definition, which has been widely used at the state
level, is offered by the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). It defines
a "public health emergency" as:
[Aln occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that:
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the
appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or
biological toxin; (iii) [a natural disaster;] (iv) [a chemical attack or accidental
release; or] (v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and (2) poses a high probability of
any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in the affected
population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected
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typically have common characteristics that pose logistically complex
governance challenges that differ from the governance of everyday
health concerns.
First, public health emergencies are discrete events that present
significant threats to health that are distinct from the health challenges
endemic to a population. As a result, mechanisms and procedures
designed to govern the health system and to protect health in
everyday circumstances may not be capable of handling the novel
39
challenges posed by a public health emergency.
Second, another aspect of the discrete nature of public health
emergencies is that they normally occur for a limited duration, at least
in their most acute phases. The temporary nature of events like an
influenza pandemic or a massive hurricane arguably renders them
easier to address from a governance perspective compared with other
ongoing and persistent governance challenges that arise in everyday
circumstances. While the crisis may be sudden and severe, the acute
effects (and cost) will resolve in a limited period of time, thereby
avoiding long-term, continuous governance complications or
obligations.4 0 Yet, the severity and magnitude of threats to health
population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses
a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the
affected population.
CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITIES, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. I, § 104(m) (Dec.
21, 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA] (alterations in original).
39 Often health system governance and capacity is not able to handle normal health
needs to achieve good health outcomes. There is ample evidence that the health system in
New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina was grossly inadequate to handle the health needs
of the population, even under nonemergency circumstances. See Evangeline (Vangy)
Franklin, A New Kind of Medical Disaster in the United States, in THERE IS NO SUCH
THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE KATRINA 185, 185-87
(Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
40 The longer-term effects of public health emergencies can also be significant, and
raise distinct governance challenges beyond the scope of this discussion. For instance, the
long term health effects of public health emergencies like radiation exposure from the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, inhalation of toxic materials in the September 11, 2001,
recovery efforts in New York, and the exposure to oil and dispersant in the Gulf of Mexico
resulting from the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill will not be known for many
years. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1068T, HEALTH EFFECTS IN
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK 7-15, 20-23 (2004)
(describing the health effects which were observed in the aftermath of the World Trade
Center attack and the efforts undertaken by various entities to monitor and understand
those health effects); Linda A. McCauley, Environments and Health: Will the BP Oil Spill
Affect Our Health?, 110 AM. J. NURSING 54, 54-56 (2010) (discussing how experts
examine the potential short- and long-term effects of the BP oil spill); Health Effects of the
Chernobyl Accident: An Overview, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 2006), http://www.who
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created by these catastrophes and the strenuous impact they place on
the health system may, to the contrary, increase the complexity of
governance challenges, particularly in the short term. Severe damage
to key parts of the governance infrastructure, such as the wholesale
destruction of communications capability during Hurricane Katrina41
or the decimation of physical infrastructure that followed the 2010
earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,4 2 heightens systemic stress until
damaged or dysfunctional systems can be repaired or circumvented.
Third, public health emergencies may require rapid and sometimes
extraordinary responses based upon the sudden and significant threats
to health and well-being, as well as other factors, created by such
43
emergencies. These factors have a particular relevance to questions
of governance since the need for expeditious and efficient actions
may inform the appropriate governance. options under the
circumstances.4
Fourth, public health emergencies arise at times and in ways that
may be difficult or even impossible to predict with specificity,
although it is often possible to foresee the general types of public
.int/ionizing-radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/index.html (reporting, twenty years
after the accident, the nature of the long-term health effects); NAT'L INST. ENVTL. HEALTH
SCI., GULF STUDY, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/about/od/programs/gulfspill/gulfstudy/index
.cfm (last updated Oct. 3, 2012) (ongoing study on the long-term health effects of the BP
oil spill).
41 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 37, 55-56.
42 See ELIZABETH FERRIS & DANIEL PETZ, THE BROOKINGS INST. - LONDON SCH. OF
ECON., A Year of Living Dangerously: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2010 44-45
(2011) (discussing how the government was almost completely paralyzed in the days
immediately following the disaster; "26,000 civil servants are estimated to have perished,
government ministries and agency headquarters were destroyed, there were major
communications difficulties," and many government employees were too traumatized to
fulfill their responsibilities).
43 Indeed, the MSEHPA definition of public health highlights the severity of the health
risk as integral to the definition of "public health emergency" in that it must pose
[A] high probability of any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths
in the affected population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities
in the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic
agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of
people in the affected population.
MSEHPA, supra note 38, at art. I, § 104(m). See also ON RISK AND DISASTER, supra note
11, at 8.
44 While the threats to health may indeed be extraordinary during a public health
emergency, the question of whether public health emergencies justify extraordinary legal
powers has raised considerable debate. See infra note 81, on the debate over extraordinary
legal powers for public health emergency response.
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health emergencies that might arise. Scientists know the locations
where hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes are likely to occur, if not
the exact timing and magnitude. These variables are quite important,
since a disaster that strikes with unanticipated severity or in an
unexpected location can overwhelm even well-designed systems.4 5
Application of advanced technologies such as disease surveillance,
epidemiology, weather tracking, and seismology,46 have increased the
likelihood of anticipating these threats in advance, but this does not
alleviate the potential for unexpected threats to materialize. This
reality suggests that governance planning should take into account
likely public health emergency scenarios and build in adaptability to
respond to less likely emergency circumstances.
The terrible destruction wreaked by Hurricane Katrina on Gulf
Coast communities exemplifies all four of these characteristics of
public health emergencies. The storm itself, one of the strongest on
record in the Gulf of Mexico, created a distinct threat to the health of
those living in communities in its path. The duration of the storm was
brief, but the aftermath of the storm and subsequent flooding in New
Orleans interrupted normal functions of government, the health
system, and other key infrastructure, resulting in short-term health
and governance challenges. A storm of this magnitude, location, and
likely consequences was not only predictable, it was effectively
predicted in a training exercise held only a year prior to the real
storm.4 7 Therefore, the inability of the formal emergency response
45 See Arnold M. Howitt & Herman B. "Dutch" Leonard, Katrina and the Core
Challenges of Disaster Response, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 216-17 (2006)
(noting that Hurricane Katrina was distinct from other "routine" emergencies due to its
novelty of scale and location), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edulvar/ezp~site
/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/crisis-leadership/katrinascore
challenges.pdf.
46 See Zhengzhang Chen et al., Discovery of Extreme Events-Related Communities in
Contrasting Groups of Physical System Networks, DATA MINING AND KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY, Aug. 6, 2012 (outlining a new predictive model for forecasting hurricanes
and large rainfalls); L. Knopoff, Earthquake Prediction: The Scientific Challenge, 93
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S. 3719 (1996) (outlining the difficulties facing earthquake
prediction efforts).
47 In 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Louisiana began
a series of meetings to develop a detailed response plan for a catastrophic hurricane.
Participating federal, state, and local staff responded to a simulated Category 3 hurricane
named Pam in order to develop strategies for predeployment, search and rescue, shelter
and temporary housing, commodity distribution, and public information, among other
functions. Insufficient funding precluded the completion of the meetings. Although the
Hurricane Pam efforts were only partially complete when Hurricane Katrina made
landfall, they still had a positive impact. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 25; see
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infrastructure to adequately respond was baffling and inexcusable.
Finally, Hurricane Katrina did require an extraordinary response, due
to the unprecedented impact inflicted by the storm on affected areas.
As described below, a number of systemic and operational
deficiencies in the governance of the storm undermined the response
and had negative health consequences.
A fifth characteristic of public health emergencies is that they
come in many varieties, and therefore preparedness and response
efforts must be adaptable. Preparing for a myriad of possible threats
presents a daunting task and may stress the functioning of relevant
legal and practical systems. Public health emergencies can arise from
biological or environmental factors and may be instigated by
intentional acts, technological failures, or unintentional "natural"
events. Biologically-based threats (SARS, H1NI influenza) may
48produce substantial mortality, possibly killing millions worldwide.
Environmental factors that threaten health, such as hurricanes and
floods, have become stronger, more frequent, and more damaging,
and have incurred widespread loss of life. 4 9 The nature of causation
also PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 4, at 123-30 (discussing methods for
better preparedness).
48 Estimates of potential influenza pandemic mortality vary. Compare Christopher J.L.
Murray et al., Estimation ofpotential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of
vital registry data from the 1918-20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis, 368 LANCET 2211,
2211 (2006) (estimating that an influenza pandemic with similar virulence to the 1918
influenza pandemic could cause sixty-two million deaths worldwide, most in developing
countries), with PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-HINL INFLUENZA viii
(2009) (presenting a model scenario with mortality rates between 30,000 and 90,000
people from the 2009 HINI novel influenza in the United States). See also Declan Butler,
How severe will the flu outbreak be?, NATURE, May 2009, at 14, 14-15 (quoting several
influenza experts on the inherent uncertainty in the morbidity and mortality caused by a
novel influenza strain); Flu View: A Weekly Influenza Surveillance Report, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flulweekly (last updated Oct.
26, 2012) (providing recent HIN1 data and showing that in 2009 and 2010, there were 282
influenza-related pediatric deaths. Compare to 133 deaths in year 2008 and 2009 and 122
deaths in year 2010 and 2011).
49 See, e.g., ELIZABETH FERRIS, THE BROOKINGS INST., NATURAL DISASTER
RESPONSE IN JAPAN AND Fiji 1 (2011) (noting that the Japan earthquake and subsequent
tsunami destroyed 120,000 buildings, caused more than $300 billion in economic
damages, and left more than 20,000 people dead); Eric Stover & Patrick Vinck, Cyclone
Nargis and the Politics ofRelief and Reconstruction Aid in Burma (Myanmar), 300 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 729, 729-30 (2008) (discussing how the unwillingness of the government in
Myanmar to accept external assistance after Cyclone Nargis exacerbated the toll exacted
by the storm); Adam B. Ellick, Floods Could Have Lasting Impact for Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/asiall7pstan.html
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of the public health emergency may affect the governance of both
preparedness and response activities. Intentionally caused
emergencies may implicate national security and the criminal law
system, while technological failures may give rise to tort claims. This
variation in causes, causation, risks, and effects of public health
emergencies further adds to the complexity of emergency response,
since the relevant systems must be sufficiently flexible and adaptable
to respond to such a variety of challenges. Table 1 provides examples
of public health emergencies.
Table 1. Examples of events within the primary categories of public health
emergencies
EnvironmentalBiological Factors FactFactors
Intentional * Smallpox release * Dirty bomb
Causation * Weaponized detonation
anthrax release * Sarin Gas attack
* Mass casualty
terrorist attack
* Nuclear detonation
Technological * Accidental release * Deep water drilling
Failure of infectious agent oil spill
* Nuclear release after
tsunami flooding
Unintentional * Pandemic Influenza * Natural disasters
Causation * SARS * Hurricanes
* Floods
* Earthquakes
2. Legal Complexity in Public Health Emergency Governance
A myriad of legal frameworks potentially apply to public health
emergency preparedness and response. This legal complexity
intersects with, and often exacerbates, the practical and logistical
complexities that permeate public health emergencies. Law plays a
vital role in the governance of public health emergencies. It
establishes the powers and infrastructures that have had the most
influence on how emergencies are governed. It legitimizes actions by
?pagewanted=all&_r-O (outlining the devastation caused by the 2010 flooding throughout
Pakistan).
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government officials and also constrains the conduct of these
officials. Further, it sets the rules for how nongovernmental entities-
from nonprofit organizations, to private corporations, to volunteers-
may participate in governance, as well as holding all participants
responsible for their conduct.so
Public health emergency governance is marked by the confluence
of several discrete strands of legal authority, only some of which are
directly targeted at resolving emergency circumstances. Emergency
responses engender the convergence of legal powers related to public
health, emergency response,. and national security. Emergency
responses further implicate legal concerns as disparate as employment
51 52law, environmental law, and the regulation of different areas of
healthcare practice.53  This complicated legal landscape can add
54
complexity and confusion to efforts to respond to emergencies.
So See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1132-
34 (2003) [hereinafter Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health] (discussing the major
legal powers necessary to respond to a public health emergency).
51 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 114-17 (urging for job protection, income replacement,
and healthcare access for those subjected to mandatory quarantine); Mark A. Rothstein &
Meghan K. Talbott, Job Security and Income Replacement for Individuals in Quarantine:
The Need for Legislation, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 239, 251-52, 255-56 (2007)
(proposing job security and income replacement for individuals under quarantine orders).
52 See, e.g., William C. Nicholson, Legal Issues in Emergency Response to Terrorism
Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials: The Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response ("HAZWOPER") Standard, Standard Operating Procedures,
Mutual Aid and the Incident Management System, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 295, 331-36
(2003) (analyzing' the legal implications of emergency response involving hazardous
materials); Victoria Sutton, Environment and Public Health in a Time of Plague, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 217, 224-33 (2004) (examining public health law and environmental law in a
post-September 11 environment); Julia C. Webb, Responsible Response: Do the
Emergency and Major Disaster Exceptions to Federal Environmental Laws Make Sense
from a Restoration and Mitigation Perspective?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL'Y REV.
529, 555-66 (2007) (noting the environmental laws implicated by emergency response to
hurricanes and the effectiveness of those laws).
53 See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Risk Management in the Wake of Hurricanes and
Other Disasters: Hospital Civil Liability Arising from the Use of Volunteer Health
Professionals During Emergencies, 10 MICH. ST. UNIV. J. MED. & L. 57 (2006) (noting
the necessity and effects of volunteer health professionals, and how hospitals must make
adjustments to accommodate them).
54 Another metric of the extent of this legal complexity is that the Department of
Homeland Security's list of "legal authorities that guide the structure, development, and
implementation of the National Response Framework," which is the key federal
emergency response plan, includes sixty-three statutes and regulations, seventeen
presidential executive orders, and twenty other presidential directives. DEP'T OF
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Even a cursory review of the statutes, regulations, and other legal
materials that form the legal framework for public health emergency
response reveals the tangled architecture of relevant laws, which exist
at federal, state, and local levels, and often overlap in their application
and interpretation. Existing legal infrastructure places the nexus of
emergency response at the local and state level, with federal officials
only intervening once the state requests assistance or the
circumstances reach a sufficient level of severity.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Stafford Act) represents the cornerstone of federal law related to
emergency management,55 and epitomizes this local-first approach.
Primarily a funding mechanism, the Stafford Act authorizes the
President to declare an "emergency" or "major disaster" at the request
of state officials or, in rare cases, without such a request. Once one of
these declarations has been made, the federal government may
provide resources including financial, material, and logistical support
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Federal law provides for several other mechanisms to enact
emergency response efforts. The National Emergencies Act57
provides the President with authority to declare a "national
emergency" without a specific state request.58 This declaration
activates any special or extraordinary powers that Congress has
previously authorized the President to use.5 9 The Posse Comitatus
Act, by contrast, prohibits federal troops from being deployed for
domestic law enforcement purposes, which limits their role during
emergencies.6o Efforts initiated after Hurricane Katrina to expand the
role of military personnel during emergencies have been
unsuccessful. 61
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK: LIST OF AUTHORITIES AND
REFERENCES (2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-authorities.pdf.
55 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5207 (2006).
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191.
57 National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2006).
58 50 U.S.C. § 1621.
59 Id.
60 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). See also Michael Greenberger, Did
the Founding Fathers Do "A Heckuva Job"? Constitutional Authorization for the Use of
Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City, 87 B.U. L. REv. 397, 406-
14 (2007) (discussing the scope and application of the Posse Comitatus Act).
61 A short-lived amendment to the Insurrection Act, would have explicitly authorized
the use of military personnel during a "natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency." Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1956), amended by John Warner
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Federal law further divides emergency preparedness and response
efforts across multiple agencies. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has become the primary federal agency for
emergency management, housing FEMA and overseeing the National
Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management
System (NIMS).62 The NRF and NIMS are detailed emergency
response plans designed to coordinate planning for emergency
preparedness and response, althou h these documents do not
themselves have the authority of law.6
Emergency powers more focused on the health aspects of
emergencies are found elsewhere in federal law. The Public Health
Service Act provides for the Secretary of the Department of Health
64
and Human Services (HHS) to declare a public health emergency.
This provision, which focuses on financial support but could be used
to justify more direct government intervention, has been invoked most
recently in response to the outbreak of novel HiNi influenza in
2009.65 The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006
expands the role of HHS in responding to and providing oversight for
public health emergencies.66 Recognizing that expertise in health can
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §
1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2404 (2006). This provision was repealed in 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 1068(a)(1), 122 Stat. 325 (2008).
62 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), issued by the President in
2003, required DHS to develop the NRF and NIMS. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., 110TH
CONG., COMPILATION OF HOMELAND SEC. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES 23, 26 (Comm.
Print 2008).
63 See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS-core.pdf [hereinafter NIMS];
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (2008), http://www.fema
.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf [hereinafter NRF].
64 "Public health emergency" is defined as follows:
If the Secretary determines, after consultation with such public health officials as
may be necessary, that
(1) a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency; or
(2) a public health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious
diseases or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists.
42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006).
65 Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH HUM.
SERVICES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/phe.swhlnl.html.
66 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat.
2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also James G. Hodge,
Jr. et al., The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act: Improving Public Health
Emergency Response, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1708, 1708-10 (2007) [hereinafter Hodge,
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act] (analyzing the major legal changes
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be vital to certain types of emergencies, the Act designates the
Secretary of HHS as the lead federal official under the NRF for public
67health emergencies. The Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREP Act) provides targeted liability protections
for anyone involved in designing, manufacturing, distributing, or
selling a medical countermeasure that has been designated by the
68Secretary of HHS to be vital to public health. This Act provides
widespread immunity to those involved with these countermeasures in
69
order to incentivize their production.
State emergency health powers coexist with this federal legal
infrastructure, and in many ways are more substantial than federal
powers since state powers are grounded in the state's inherent police
powers.70 All states have enacted legislation that permits state
government, and in many cases local government as well, to act in
71
response to emergencies. States permit the declaration of an
"emergency" or "disaster," or in some cases both, which changes the
legal landscape relevant to emergency response and permits greater
72
authority to respond rapidly. State level legislation or executive
orders may enact emergency preparedness plans, authorize the
deployment of state resources, and waive licensing requirements and
other regulations. These legal provisions also may empower state
officials to evacuate affected areas, shutter schools or public events,
and restrict movement of individuals, consistent with constitutional
due process limitations.74 Emergency management officials at the
state or local level implement these powers on behalf of the
implemented in the Act). The role of the Secretary of HHS under these circumstances is
further delineated in Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF-8), an annex to the NRF. See
generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES SECURITY, EMERGENCY SUPPORT
FUNCTION #8-PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES ANNEX (2008), http://www.fema
.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-08.pdf.
67 42 U.S.C. § 300hh.
68 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a).
69 Id.
70 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824); see GOSTIN, Power, Duty, Restraint, supra
note 24, at 94. 1
71 See Hodge et al., supra note 13, at 26-28 (describing the scope of state emergency
powers).
72 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage
During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 249, 263-65 (2008).
73 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 622, 623-25 (2002) [hereinafter Gostin, MSEHPA] (describing state
emergency powers).
74 Id. at 626-27.
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governor.7 5 While state law varies considerably across the country,
many states have enacted additional legislation that specifically
authorizes public health officials to respond to public health
emergencies. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA), drafted in 2001, has had a strong influence on the legal
76
regimes in many of these states. Finally, the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has been enacted by all
fifty states, and allows for resource sharing between states during
77times of declared emergencies.
In sum, many of the most relevant legislative and policy reform
efforts related to public health emergency preparedness, such as the
MSEHPA at the state level, modifications to the NRF and NIMS at
the national level, and the International Health Regulations at the
international level, were premised on creating better systemic
frameworks for public health emergency governance through more
detailed processes and more competent and responsive
infrastructures.
The influence of law on the governance of public health
emergencies goes beyond the structural framework it provides. It also
presents a venue for articulating and legitimizing the normative
aspects of emergency preparedness and response. Laws may establish
and codify norms of conduct and cooperation, as well as setting the
overall goals to be sought through public health emergency
75 See Hodge et al., supra note 13, at 26-29 (describing the effects of state emergency
powers declarations).
76 A recent assessment concluded that forty-one states and Washington, D.C. have
enacted some components of this model act into their state laws. NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH LAW, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: SUMMARY
MATRIX (June 2012) (on file with author).
77 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. (1996).
78 See Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 625-26 (describing the MSEHPA and the
impetus behind the CDC's request to draft these model state programs); Naim Kapucu,
Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Environments ofDisasters: The Evolution of
Intergovernmental Disaster Response Systems, 6 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY
MGMT. (2009) (evaluating the changes from the Federal Response Plan to the NRF);
Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health Regulations during Influenza A
(HIN1) Epidemic, 2009, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1165, 1165 (2009)
(concluding that there is "the need for sound international health agreements and ... all
nations [need] to implement these agreements to the best of their abilities"); Benjamin
Mason Meier et al., Modernizing State Public Health Enabling Statutes to Reflect the
Mission and Essential Services of Public Health, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 112
(2009) (study measuring the effectiveness of the Turning Point Model State Public Health
Act in assisting states to develop their individual state plans).
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preparedness and response efforts. To the extent that these
established norms differ across different aspects of the applicable law,
confusion, inconsistency, and injustice may result.
The impact of law on the enterprise of governance, however, must
be viewed in the larger context of the entire system involved in public
health emergency response. Many other factors and actors are
involved in emergency governance outside those formally established
by the legal infrastructure. Nongovernmental actors, such as nonprofit
organizations, private corporations, including hospitals and
pharmaceutical companies, and volunteers, may play key roles in
providing services and support during a public health emergency, yet
these roles may not be formally recognized by the emergency
80
response infrastructure. Complicating this calculus, these actors are
regulated and influenced by a wider set of laws, social traditions, and
economic factors that exert control and pressure on their actions.
Thus, while it can be said that law is the most influential factor in
governing a public health emergency, numerous other factors
measurably affect governance as well.
Using a governance paradigm is useful given the increasing
complexity of public health emergencies, the unusually high risk to
health, and the need for sudden response efforts. Yet many of the
contentious debates surrounding reform of public health emergency
powers have adopted a narrower focus, mostly gravitating toward
discussions about the appropriate level of authority and discretion that
the government should wield in its emergency response efforts.si One
7 See generally Lance Gable, The Proliferation of Human Rights in Global Health
Governance, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 534 (2007) (explaining the relationship between
structural and normative aspects of human rights law).
80 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 10.
81 A vehement debate has swirled around the issue of whether the law should allow
extraordinary public health emergency powers at all. Compare Gostin, Public Health Law
in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 12, 86-91 (defending the use of emergency legal
powers in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act), with George J. Annas, Blinded
by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33,
45-54 (2003) (criticizing the Model Act for providing insufficient legal protections for due
process). On the related question of whether limited public health resources should be used
for public health emergency preparedness, see CENTURY FOUND., ARE BIOTERRORISM
DOLLARS MAKING US SAFER? (Jan. 12, 2005), http://tcf.org /media-center/2005/pr44
(Recommendation 6 states, "[a] balance must be struck between preparing for a biological
attack and maintaining and expanding other vital functions of the public health system.").
Secondarily, if the law does allow such powers, there is a debate over what their normative
content should be, and to what extent these powers need to be constrained to avoid
mistakes, abuse, or other negative consequences. See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens
Health, supra note 50, at 1159-69 (setting out detailed philosophical arguments supporting
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advantage of the governance paradigm is that it moves beyond that
debate; not because it is unimportant, but because it has crowded out
other timely and consequential discussions about the effects of law
within broader governance models and how these laws influence
outcomes during a public health emergency response.
C Governance Failures During Public Health Emergencies
History suggests that governance failures can undermine efforts to
respond to public health emergencies and indeed exacerbate the
severity of these emergencies and their impacts on health. Emergency
responses prone to governance failure commonly exhibit traits of
novelty, magnitude, or surprise, such as the outbreak of a novel
disease, an earthquake in an area not known for seismic activity, or a
hurricane of unusual strength, like Hurricane Katrina. The significant
consequences of governance failure during public health emergencies
necessitate that these failures be taken seriously and their causes
addressed.
It is important to note that governance failures during emergency
responses are the exception rather than the norm. Despite the
logistical and legal complexity of public health emergency
governance, responses to many events that qualify as public health
emergencies occur without significant negative impacts on the health
of the population. A few recent examples demonstrate this point.
When severe flooding threatened several cities in North Dakota in
2009, and again in 2011, rapid response efforts by federal, state, and
local governments and members of the affected communities avoided
82
a more serious catastrophe. Hurricane responses to less serious
storms than Hurricane Katrina have been executed extremely well
with support from all levels of government and private sector
extraordinary emergency health powers and discussing the normative content of these
powers); see, e.g., James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REv.
1191 (2003) (critiquing the MSEHPA); Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism,
and Public Health: Comments on Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221
(2003) (same); Bruce Jennings, On Authority and Justification in Public Health, 55 FLA.
L. REv. 1241 (2003) (same); TROTTER, supra note 16, at 51-52 (same).
82 The response efforts to these two floods used a variety of governmental and
nongovernmental resources from FEMA, applied NIMS and Incident Command Structure,
state National Guard, Medical Reserve Corps, Red Cross, and other nonprofit and
volunteer assistance. See N.D. Nat'l Guard, North Dakota Flood 2011 Fact Sheet, NAT'L
GUARD (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nationalguard.com/news/2011/apr/ll/north-dakota
-flood-201 1-fact-sheet.
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83partners. The opening of the Morganza Spillway locks on the
Mississippi River during 2011 floods prevented large-scale flooding
in several major cities.84 The rapid efforts to forestall a major
influenza pandemic in 2009 and 2010 were arguably helpful in
minimizing the spread of the disease and reducing morbidity and
mortality.ss These emergency response efforts and many others
suggest that, in many cases, the emergency response system functions
relatively effectively. Determining good governance outcomes
presents a different challenge. It is often quite difficult to set goals ex
ante given the prevalence of uncertainty and to assess whether the
best outcome has indeed occurred ex post.
Nevertheless, logistical and legal complexity raises the potential
for system failure when factors coalesce in ways that strain the design
and operation of the response system. When such failures occur, the
results can be catastrophic. System failure in this context refers to the
inability of the system to adequately function as designed and to
achieve its goals, namely to respond efficiently and mitigate harms to
health and property, among other concerns. Hurricane Katrina
provides the emblematic example of such a system-wide failure. The
problems encountered with the Hurricane Katrina response were
myriad, but can be grouped according to two types of system failure:
(1) systemic design deficiencies built into the emergency response
infrastructure and (2) operational deficiencies in the implementation
of emergency response plans and tools. Improving governance of
public health emergency response requires addressing both types of
system failure.
1. Systemic Design Deficiencies
Systemic design deficiencies in emergency response governance
occur as a byproduct of poorly designed or inflexible preparedness
and response systems. Inadequate design in the emergency
preparedness and response system arises from the logistical and legal
83 See MITCHELL L. MOSS & CHARLES SHELHAMER, CENTER FOR CATASTROPHE
PREPARATION & RESPONSE, THE STAFFORD ACT: PRIORITIES FOR REFORM 8 (2007)
(noting that for the ten-year period between 1996 and 2006, FEMA responded to 151
emergencies and 597 major disasters); see also DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-09-78, Management Advisory Report: FEMA's Response to
Hurricane Ike 1-6 (June 2009) (finding that FEMA and its federal and state partners
responded effectively to the disaster).
84 Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/15spillway.html?_r-0.
85 See Gable et al., supra note 5.
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complexity of the system, as well as the historical, piecemeal
development of different components of the system. As the previous
section suggests, applicable law creates a veritable morass of
intersecting authorities relevant to emergency response, cutting across
jurisdictional boundaries, multiple agencies, and both public and
private entities. Coupled with the need to address emergencies of
unexpected scope and composition, this multivariate emergency
response system raises concerns in several areas, including
federalisni-based confusion over which jurisdictional entity is in
charge, overlapping authority between different government agencies,
legal uncertainty for nongovernment responders, and reliance on a
governnent-controlled, linear response system.
Federalism and perceived systemic constraints. A significant
concern with the design of the emergency response system stems
from the division of legal powers across federal, state, and local
86governments. Generally speaking, the emergency response system
creates a hierarchical framework that places responsibility for
emergency response in the hands of local officials. Depending on the
severity of the circumstances and the capabilities of the local
jurisdiction, mechanisms exist to enlist the support of state
government and then the federal government at the request of state
87
officials. This aptly named "'pull' system of intergovernmental
relief' allows the local government to "pull" resources from the state
and federal governments when their own supplies have been
extinguished or overwhelmed.8 8  The converse approach, which
allows the federal government to "push" resources on the local
governments in a time of national crisis or catastrophe, is only
86 Debates about federalism have advanced the persistent question of whether public
health emergency powers should be situated at the federal, state, or local levels. Some
scholars have supported maintaining legal powers at the state and local levels of
government during a public health emergency. See Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of
Terrorism, supra note 12, at 86-87 (addressing the federalism debate and supporting state-
based emergency powers). This approach promotes consistency with the normal
jurisdictional arrangement for public health powers, recognizes the importance of local
knowledge regarding public health needs, and ensures that responders and decision makers
alike are personally invested in the outcome in the community. See James G. Hodge, Jr.,
The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 338-57
(1997-98). Further, this model mirrors the infrastructure set forward in emergency
management statutes, which also begin with state-centered decision making.
97 Saundra Schneider, Who's to Blame? (Mis) Perceptions of the Intergovernmental
Response to Disasters, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 715, 716-18 (2008) (discussing the
intergovernmental disaster response infrastructure).
88 Id. at 718-19.
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permitted under very limited circumstances.89 The roots of such a
model for emergency response grow from the federalist tradition that
seeks to balance state and federal powers.90
The federal Stafford Act leaves much decision-making auihority
with the state government, introducing federalism-based constraints
that can deter rapid action by the federal government without state
sanction.91 Indeed, during Hurricane Katrina, federalism concerns
slowed federal action for several days, as federal, state, and local
officials debated the appropriate roles and authorities of each
government entity to respond, resulting in delayed response and
rescue efforts and increased suffering and loss of life. 92
Dual declarations and parallel lines of authority. A second
potential concern arises from the distribution of emergency response
powers across different government agencies within a particular
jurisdiction. The presence of overlapping legal provisions can lead to
the "dual declaration" problem. 9 3 Many state governments have
distinct departments res Ponsible for public health and emergency
management functions.9 States also often have distinct legislation
dealing with disaster response, raising the concern that multiple
concurrent declarations may be enacted during an emergency. During
public heath emergencies, these agencies may have conflicting
mandates and overlapping legal authority to engage in response
efforts.9 States have worked to harmonize and resolve these potential
conflicts, but many aspects of state infrastructure remain distinct
96despite their interconnected roles. The responsibilities and authority
allocated to each department may not be sufficiently clear, which
could lead to power struggles, blame shifting, hesitation, or difficulty
in cross-agency coordination.
Legal deterrents for nongovernmental entities to participate in
response efforts. The role of nongovernmental actors, such as private
sector health care providers, nonprofit organizations, suppliers, and
89 Joe Whitley et al., Homeland Security After Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4 (2006).
90 Elizabeth F. Kent, "Where's the Calvary?" Federal Response to 21' Century
Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 181, 185-86 (2006).
91 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5207, 5191-5192 (2006).
92 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 522.
93 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 28-29.
94 Id. at 22-29.
95 Id. at 28-29.
96 Id.
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volunteers, is integral to an effective emergency response. Often these
participants provide valuable assistance to those affected by the
emergency. Numerous state and federal legal provisions apply to
these potential participants, and the law may encourage or limit the
activities of these nongovernmental actors in their response efforts. 7
Law can be structured to facilitate participation of these actors, for
example, by allowing license reciprocity for healthcare volunteers
from other states or extending workers' compensation coverage to
these volunteers, as is provided by EMAC and some state emergency
laws. However, where these provisions are not in place, the legal
landscape may deter participation by some of these actors who may
be concerned about liability and other legal consequences of their
participation.
Reliance on a government-controlled, linear response system. Most
emergency response and public health emergency powers take a
linear approach to emergency response with government ensconced as
the central actor.99 Actions in the system are predicated on
government decisions and are largely driven by government efforts.
This approach envisions a strong government role in conducting and
coordinating efforts to implement emergency preparedness and
response. Linear models of governance often take on the
characteristics of stringent, hierarchical infrastructures, with chains of
command and exercise of control by those at the top of the command
structure. This type of model is not limited to a specific level of
government or a specific type of agency within the government.
Rather, top-down, command-and-control approaches to governance
can exist at any level of government.
2. Operational Deficiencies
Operational deficiencies present an altogether different set of
governance concerns during public health emergencies. Instead of the
system design itself being the problem, operational deficiencies arise
when different components or participants in the system fail to
execute the system as designed, leading to negative results.
Operational deficiencies typically occur in two types of
circumstances: when the nature of the emergency overwhelms the
97 See id. at 20-21, 46-58.
98 Id. at 48-52.
99 See infra Part III.A for a more detailed description of this traditional governance
approach.
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capacity of the system to operate, or when key individuals make poor
decisions that undermine the functioning of the system.
Overwhelming or unexpected impact. If the emergency
circumstances are catastrophic and overwhelm the capacity of the
system to respond or even function, operational failure can result. For
example, during Hurricane Katrina, when local governments had their
capability to formally request state and federal assistance destroyed
by the wrath of the storm, the rigid formal request mechanism
impeded the functioning of the system and delayed needed
assistance.1 00 National planning has recognized that supply or
personnel shortages during a severe pandemic could create scarcity
that would affect the standards of care available to those seeking
health services.10 1 Indeed, specific medicine shortages and inability to
evacuate led to the deaths of many hospitalized patients in the days
after Hurricane Katrina.1 02 The 2010 earthquake in Haiti presents yet
another compelling example. The magnitude of the earthquake and its
location, together with the weak physical infrastructure of buildings in
Port-au-Prince, undermined the operation of virtually every aspect of
society and necessitated substantial external assistance.10 3
Poor decision making. The infrastructure of emergency response
relies primarily on a limited number of individual decision makers to
make key assessments and control the government response effort. In
most emergency preparedness and response systems, the decisions of
individuals have a great impact on health and other outcomes. Often
legal provisions complicate this decision-making process. In early
emergency preparedness tabletop exercises, the most glaring failure
was the poor performance of integral decision makers.1 0 4 Legal
powers were insufficient, or sufficiently vague, in ways that
100 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 522-23.
101 INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
USE IN DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 13-15 (2009), http://www.iom.edu
/-/media/Files/Report Files/2009/DisasterCareStandards/Standards of Care report brief
FINAL.pdf.
102 See BRADFORD H. GRAY & KATHY HEBERT, THE URBAN INST., HOSPITALS IN
HURRICANE KATRINA: CHALLENGES FACING CUSTODIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A DISASTER
3-4, 7 (2006), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411348_katrinahospitals.pdf.
103 See FERRIS & PETZ, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that the Haiti earthquake killed over
316,000 Haitians, injured over 300,000 people, displaced more than 1.8 million people,
and caused some $8 billion in damages).
104 See Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from
TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436, 439-43 (2001); Tara O'Toole et al.,
Shining Light on "Dark Winter, " 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 972, 979-82 (2002).
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complicated understandings of law and undermined rapid response. os
Poor performance by decision makers resulted in negative outcomes,
and in some cases, the entire emergency response systems were
derailed. 0 6
This problem has been effectuated in real emergency responses as
well, most notably Hurricane Katrina, in which many of the
designated decision makers performed poorly. The slow response and
poor decisions made at all levels of government during Hurricane
Katrina greatly exacerbated the toll of the storm on life and health. 107
Resources from the federal level were delayed for days while officials
waited to deploy assets through FEMA and Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams. os Political considerations also affected decision
making, with Louisiana Governor Blanco refusing to release state-
based National Guard members to participate in the federal
response.109 Whether poor decision making emanates from ineptitude,
maliciousness, fear, or merely a wrong guess about consequences, the
concentration of powers granted to specific individuals under existing
emergency response laws and policies is a potential problem during
any emergency response.
3. Interconnected Deficiencies in Public Health Emergency
Governance
The above examples raise significant systemic design and
operational concerns. When both systemic design and operational
deficiencies arise within the emergency response system, they are
often intertwined and inextricable. If the emergency response system
cannot function when its linear and centralized structure is disrupted,
then it can easily fail during large or unexpected disasters, as indeed it
did during Hurricane Katrina. Thus, even where logistical and legal
105 In the TOPOFF exercises the decision-making officials were uninformed, often
acting in ways that defied scientific understandings of disease epidemiology and
constitutional powers. Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 439-43; O'Toole et al., supra
note 104, at 979-82.
106 See Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 443-44.
107 See Kim Elliott, Public Health Preparedness in the 21st Century, 58 ADMIN. L.
REv. 595, 604 (2006) (describing the command-and-control approach as one of the
downfalls to Hurricane Katrina's inadequate response).
1t See MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 11, at 231-36 (detailing delay in the
deployment of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams after Hurricane Katrina).
109 Ryan, supra note 11, at 528-32.
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infrastructures are well designed, the translation of legal powers to
good governance is not assured.
Legal approaches to public health emergencies presuppose a linear
relationship between legal powers granted to the government, the
proper execution of those powers, and the resultant beneficial effect
on health, which occurs as a consequence of this competent
execution. This causal presumption does not accurately reflect the
reality of how law is used in practice, especially in the often-
convoluted setting of a public health emergency. The linear flow of
this narrative may be disrupted by the complexity of the situation, the
multitude of participants who have influence over the potential
outcome of the situation, and the inherent limitations on the ability of
a legal infrastructure to adequately address-and govern-all of these
variables.
The Hurricane Katrina response again illustrates this problem
explicitly: while legal powers and emergency response frameworks to
enact more rapid response efforts existed on the books, they were not
used effectively.110 The National Response Plan (NRP) enacted by
the federal government in 2004 to coordinate responses to "Incidents
of National Significance" did not provide sufficient guidance for
determining whether an event qualified as an Incident of National
Significance, neglected to include procedures for invoking the NRP,
and failed to detail the actions to be taken under the NRP.
The disconnect between legal powers and implementation is not
limited to Hurricane Katrina. Poorly designed systems are a
commonly cited problem within assessments of emergency
governance. For example, early public health emergency tabletop
exercises identified numerous systemic deficiencies in emergency
response governance.1 12 These failures revealed that systems that are
not resilient enough to survive a bad decision maker should be
redesigned to enhance their resilience and to have the capacity to
respond to predictable failures.
110 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA , supra note 11, at 23 (noting that during the
Katrina response, there were several significant departures from the NRP protocols).
I11 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 13-15.
112 The first bioterrorism "table top" exercises, known as "TOPOFF" and "Dark
Winter," preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These exercises challenged
actual government officials playing roles with hypothetical emergency scenarios of a
plague outbreak and smallpox outbreak, and confirmed that emergency preparedness
infrastructure was insufficiently developed. See Inglesby et al., supra note 104, at 437-43;
O'Toole et al., supra note 104, at 976-83.
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II
MODELS OF GOVERNANCE: APPLYING CONCEPTIONS OF
GOVERNANCE TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
The discussion above identifies numerous significant governance
problems in the current emergency response system in the United
States. Applying governance theory to public health emergencies can
help resolve these problems and develop a better system. Governance
theory seeks to explain shifting approaches and innovations in law,
policy, and regulation. Discussions of governance theory also have
fostered the process of developing alternative governance models to
account for increasingly complex societal conditions." 3
Alternative governance models may provide a means to circumvent
components of traditional governance models that render them
ineffective, susceptible to breakdown, myopic, or otherwise
suboptimal in practical applications. Indeed, the response to
Hurricane Katrina epitomized each of these problems with traditional
governance models. Therefore, the field of public health emergency
preparedness and response, with its inherent complexity and recent
history of systemic failures, presents a ripe target for the application
of alternative approaches to governance.
Theories of governance have benefitted from the influx and cross-
fertilization of ideas from a variety of disciplines, bringing together
insights from law, political science, history, philosophy, systems
theory, and other social sciences. The resulting scholarship is an
interesting, but often impenetrable, array of ideas that challenge-or
in some cases defend-the regulatory status quo and commonly held
understandings of how events and behavior are managed and
influenced within complex systems.l14
113 Governance theory has captured the interest of scholars and policy makers in recent
years, yielding a robust scholarly literature on governance that has proliferated to explore a
wide range of approaches. See generally Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative
Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543 (2007);
Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18 (reviewing the
development of governance scholarship); Hunter, supra note 32, at 91 (discussing three
types of governance theory in relation to public health: dominant state authority,
public/private administrative governance models, and governmentality). In addition, a
specialized journal has been created to examine the interplay between regulation and
governance, appropriately titled REGULATION & GOVERNANCE. See Braithwaite et al.,
supra note 18, at 1 (introducing the new journal and explaining its priorities and interests).
114 Critiques of government regulation and the rigidity of top-down governance
approaches have a long intellectual history, but the level of interest in this topic has
expanded over the past two decades. See Burris, Changes in Governance, supra note 19, at
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The landscape of governance theory in the early twenty-first
century is best navigated by dividing theories of governance into three
primary categories: (1) traditional governance models, (2) New
Governance models, and (3) diffuse governance models. The models
described in these three categories, in turn, can be differentiated
according to the extent of government control and centralization
present in the structure and the mechanisms of governance in each
model. As described below, traditional governance models tend to
exhibit a high degree of hierarchy through strong government control
and more centralized approaches to governing. New Governance
models, by comparison, bring together governmental and
nongovernmental actors to work together to govern. The resulting
governance schemes, therefore, contain less government control and
centralization relative to traditional governance models. Finally,
diffuse governance models operate with minimal direct government
control and less centralization. Figure 1 depicts the two continua of
government control and centralization.
Figure 1: Governance models can be mapped across two continua of
government control and centralization
More government control
Less centralization More centralization
Less government control
The sections that follow first define each of the three models of
governance and then compare them according to criteria of
government control and centralization. These models can be used to
explain different aspects of current public health emergency response
infrastructure. Indeed, it is notable that existing components of the
emergency response system in the United States fall within each of
these governance models. Further, these governance models can be
applied to develop recommendations for improving governance of
44-60 (discussing a range of theories of governance); Lobel, supra note 18, at 371-403
(identifying key aspects of new governance theory); Jason M. Solomon, Book Review
Essay, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REv. 819,
821-37 (2008) (reviewing the new governance literature).
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public health emergencies through law and policy reform. Most
importantly, the governance approaches used under these models are
not inherently contradictory; rather, they can coexist and complement
each other since each model has distinct strengths and weaknesses in
the context of public health emergency response. This realization
supports the development of an integrated pluralistic governance
approach, outlined in Part IV of the Article, which supports and
applies these governance models simultaneously. Integrated
pluralistic governance allows governance models to reinforce each
other and create a more resilient, redundant, and adaptable public
health emergency response system that is more likely to avoid
systemic design or operational failures.
A. Traditional Governance Models
1. Understanding Traditional Governance Models
Traditional governance models typically involve government
actors using direct legal authority to control events or actions. These
models are grounded on the centralized, command-and-control
governance systems that have evolved and predominated since the
rise of the regulatory state in the United States.' 15 As such, traditional
models of governance employ a hierarchical structure with formal
rules and regulatory authority vested in government agencies and
officials.l16 The "traditional" label, for this model reflects not only its
widespread adoption, but also its well-established position as the
default approach for governance.
Under traditional governance models for public health
emergencies, legislation and regulations dictate the amount of control
and specific substantive authority granted to the government, the
method by which emergency powers are allocated, and the inherent
and explicit limitations placed upon these powers by the law." 7
Emergency response laws at the federal level (e.g., Stafford Act,
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act) and the state level (e.g.,
state emergency response laws, EMAC) fit within traditional models
of governance, since they prioritize government control of response
115 See Christopher K. Leman, Direct Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A
GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE 48, 49-53 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
116 Id.
117 See MSEHPA, supra note 38, arts. IV-VI, §§ 401-608 (outlining state emergency
public health powers in legislative language).
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efforts and centralize coordination of response activities. Emergency
response plans such as the NRF and NIMS similarly outline the
government role in response efforts through the traditional
governance model. The Incident Command System, which forms the
backbone of these response plans, adopts a prototypical command-
and-control governance model.
The level of centralization found in traditional governance models
will vary somewhat depending on whether the legal framework that
outlines the emergency governance structure consolidates authority
within a single government agency or whether authority is distributed
across governmental institutions. Likewise, the amount of
centralization will differ based on whether legal authority exists at the
federal, state, or local level, with federally-based legal authority being
the most centralized and locally-based authority the least centralized
under typical circumstances. The level of control and centralization
may be affected by whether the governance policies were developed
at a single moment or piecemeal over a long period of time.
Nevertheless, traditional governance models exhibit high levels of
both government control and centralization, regardless of these
specific variations. 1s Figure 2 depicts traditional governance models
along the continua of government control and centralization.
118 State and local governments can exhibit high centralization since the emergency
response efforts being coordinated by that government entity will be centralized at the
state or local level. By contrast, alternative governance models would adopt more
decentralized approaches with nongovernmental actors more actively involved in
governance.
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Figure 2: Traditional governance models
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Despite the status quo nature of these models, traditional
governance is hardly an ossified or obsolete construct. Indeed, in
addition to their ongoing prominence in law and policy, one subset of
academic theorists looks at improving and diversifying governance
within the context of traditional government actors and infrastructure
under the heading of democratic experimentalism." Although these
scholars discuss modifying bureaucracy, adopting new technologies,
and restructuring institutions, they primarily embrace the continuing
centrality of government institutions as the lynchpin of
120governance.
2. Traditional Governance Models and Public Health Emergencies
Traditional governance models pervade the existing approaches to
preparing for and responding to public health emergencies. In the
context of public health emergencies, a government-centered,
command-and-control approach is exemplified by the authorization of
coercive governmental powers to abate the spread of disease-
quarantine, isolation, vaccination, and medical intervention.121 Even
119 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314-23 (1998) (developing a theory of
democratic experimentalism based on decentralization of government and the development
of information pooling, public/private coordination, and mutual learning).
120 See id. at 469-73.
121 See MSEHPA, supra note 38, arts. V-VI, §§ 501-608 (outlining state emergency
powers). These public health powers are available in many cases where infectious disease
OREGON LAW REVIEW
where public health powers generally and emergency powers
specifically have been jurisdictionally or structurally decentralized,
the command-and-control model remains the favored approach. Thus,
state and local officials frequently follow a strict internal hierarchy
when engaged in emergency preparedness and response efforts.122
The role of the federal government in the governance of public
health emergencies has gradually increased over the past sixty
years,123 but the state-centric model has been retained through the
Stafford Act.124 The Stafford Act reinforces the primary role of state
and local resources and the supplementary nature of federal
support.125 This form of federalism in disaster response has been and
continues to be the preferred model. Functionally, since state and
local governments take the lead in emergency response, this approach
decentralizes decision making and authority to the local levels.
However, conflicts over control and coordination can occur in
systems that distribute emergency response powers across different
government agencies within a particular jurisdiction. States have
worked to harmonize and resolve these potential conflicts, but many
aspects of state infrastructure remain decentralized to an extent.126
While federal and state disaster response plans have consistently been
civilian programs, many of their structural aspects build upon well-
established military regulations and practices, including the Incident
Command System. 12 These systems take a relatively rigid
hierarchical approach to organizing and coordinating an emergency
response.
The passage of several pieces of legislation has solidified a more
active and responsive federal role in public health emergency
threatens public health, not just in circumstances that meet the criteria for public health
emergencies. See GOSTIN, POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT, supra note 24, at 371-76, 437-45
(describing public health powers for infectious disease control).
122 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 45-63 (detailing the Incident Command System for
state and local governments to apply during emergency responses).
123 See MOSS & SHELHAMER, supra note 83, at 10-13 (providing a detailed description
of the history and gradual evolution of federal law and policy related to disaster response).
124 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5207 (2006) (building on prior emergency management legislation beginning with
the Civil Defense Act of 1950).
125 42 U.S.C. § 5195.
126 See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 72, at 269-71 (discussing state efforts to adapt
to changing legal environments through coordination during public health emergencies).
127 See MISKEL, supra note 13, at 8-10 (describing the key military operational features
that have been incorporated into federal emergency response systems); NIMS, supra note
63, at 45-63 (describing the Incident Command System).
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governance. The creation of DHS by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 represented an effort to centralize and strengthen federal
government authority in emergency response systems.128 The most
important components of federal response infrastructure-FEMA,
NRF, and NIMS-are controlled by DHS.129 The NRF and NIMS
seek to establish a comprehensive and consistent national plan that is
intended to affect public health emergency governance at all
jurisdictional levels, and therefore represent a significant expansion in
coordinated planning for emergency preparedness and response.130
The NRF and NIMS comprise, in some ways, the most hierarchical
components of the emergency response system in the United
States.131 They reiterate a command-and-control approach and a
preference for local-level control.132 Two of the six intended goals of
the NRP (the predecessor of the NRF that was in place during
Hurricane Katrina) and NIMS, to "incorporate emergency
management and law enforcement into a single structure" and
"provide one way of operating for all events," exemplify the limiting
one-size-fits-all mentality engrained in a command-and-control
structure. 133
128 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-613).
129 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) issued by the President in
2003, required DHS to develop the NRF and NIMS. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 60, at 23, 26; NIMS, supra note 63, at 8; NRF, supra note 63, at 6.
130 NIMS, supra note 63, at 11-16; NRF, supra note 63, at 7-12. Notably, the Stafford
Act, National Emergencies Act, DHS, FEMA, NRF, and NIMS adopt the all-hazards
approach. In theory, this approach covers all types of emergencies including public health
emergencies. Yet most declarations made under the Stafford Act arise from emergencies
or disasters caused by environmental factors. According to FEMA's disaster search
engine, only four incidents have ever warranted an emergency or disaster declaration on
the basis of a "virus threat." See Disaster Declarations, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov
/news/disasters.fema (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). The search engine allows targeted
research for declarations of major disaster and emergency by state, region, or disaster type.
Id.
131 Although, in other respects, they adopt New Governance models. See discussion
infra Part III.B.
132 NRF, supra note 63, at 10 ("Incidents must be managed at the lowest possible
jurisdictional level . . . ."); see also NIMS, supra note 63, at 12 ("A basic premise of both
NIMS and the NRF is that incidents typically be managed at the local level first.").
133 John R. Harrald, Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster
Response, 604 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCI. 256, 267 (2006); see
also Lobel, supra note 18, at 379 ("A central critique of the old regulatory model is its
one-size-fits-all approach.").
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The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006
established an expanded role for HHS in responding to public health
emergencies.1 34 The Act extends federal oversight over the public
health emergency response system in several ways. First, the Act
designates the Secretary of HHS as the lead federal official under the
NRP for public health emergencies. 13 This approach breaks with the
typical practice of having DHS officials fill this role, and thus the
provision recognizes the importance of having health professionals
guide response efforts during a public health emergency. The Act
asserts federal control over a number of emergency response
programs that had previously been under state and local control.3
Further, the Act requires the coordination of the National Disaster
Medical System, s compels measurement of emergency
pieparedness benchmarks at the state and local levels,' 39 and provides
incentives and infrastructure for the development of medical
countermeasures to combat biological threats.140 Taken together,
these provisions represent a transition to much more extensive federal
involvement in the governance of public health emergencies, although
it remains to be seen what practical effects will come from this
legislation.
State governments retain most of the legal authority to conduct
public health activities through their inherent police powers. Police
powers also authorize emergency management efforts. Yet in most
states, as in the federal government, the agencies responsible for
public health and emergency management are separate. 141 Until
recently, the public health community, including state and local
government health officials, was not involved in public health
emergency preparedness or response efforts coordinated by
government emergency managers. The legal landscape did not
134 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120
Stat. 2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Hodge,
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, supra note 66, at 1708-10 (analyzing the
major legal changes implemented in this Act).
135 42 U.S.C. § 300hh.
136 See Hodge, Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, supra note 66, at 1708.
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 300hh-2, 300hh-15.
138 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10.
139 42 U.S;C. § 247d-3a.
140 42 U.S.C. § 247d-7e.
141 See Hodge, Legal Frameworkfor Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 28-29.
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habitually recognize a public health emergency, and where such
provisions did exist, they were often inadequate.142
Law reform efforts related to state-level public health emergency
powers began in earnest in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and the release of anthrax spores via mail in October
2001. The Center for Law and the Public's Health spearheaded the
initiative to draft a model state law that would clarify, modernize, and
enhance the public health emergency powers available to state
officials. The resulting model law, the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act (MSEHPA), offered a state-centered model, which
augmented the existing powers of state officials in their efforts to
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.143
The MSEHPA provides a powerful state-level example of
traditional governance, although one that incorporates some New
Governance ideas in various places.144 The MSEHPA preconditions a
declaration of public health emergency and the subsequent
augmentation of legal powers on the declaration of the state
governor. 1 4 5 The declaration authorizes a number of specific powers
to be used as appropriate by government officials and places authority
in the hands of government public health officials. 6 Although it
represents prototypical top-down governance, the approach taken by
the MSEHPA has been justified as an effort to efficiently respond to
urgent and extraordinary threats. 1 4 7 Additionally, by placing public
health officials in the position of governing authority, the MSEHPA
recognizes the importance of public health expertise in governing
officials. The federal Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
later adopted the same approach, designating the Secretary of HHS as
the lead official under the NRP during a declared public health
emergency.148 In practice, the MSEHPA had a significant effect on
the legal landscape across the country. Many states have introduced
and passed bills incorporating sections of the MSEHPA, and its
142 See Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 623-24 (describing the deficiencies of
existing state emergency laws).
143 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; see also Gostin, MSEHPA, supra note 73, at 625-26
(outlining the major provisions of the MSEHPA).
144 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
145 MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. IV, § 401.
146 Id.
147 See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note 50, at 1161-68; see also
infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing public health emergency governance complexities).
148 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a) (2006).
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widespread adoption has brought more consistency to state-level
public health emergency powers in the United States.14 9
The MSEHPA immediately generated a substantial amount of
commentary and controversy, much of it grounded in the archetypical
concerns usually raised over traditional governance models. Even
though the drafters of the Act strenuously made the case that
procedural protections and limitations had been included to check the
power of government, 1o critics were wary of the Act due to its
perceived expansion of government power. 15 Critics of public health
emergency law reform initiatives additionally cited the increasing
connection of public health emergencies with national security efforts
as particularly troubling.152 However, the interaction of public health
and emergency management has to occur at some level in order to
respond effectively to the health threats raised in a public health
emergency, despite the clash of cultures and legal authorities.15 3
EMAC, the interstate agreement that permits states to share and
request assistance duting emergencies, also adopts some aspects of
traditional governance models. States are the primary actors under the
compact, and the liability and workers' compensation protections
149 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT: STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY (2006), http://www.publichealthlaw.net
/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%2OActivity.pdf (containing the list of states that have
passed the MSEHPA legislation along with legislation numbers and differences).
150 See Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note 50, at 1161-68.
151 See supra note 81 (providing a detailed description of this debate).
152 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 32, at 96 (suggesting that "the conceptual model for
public health emergency response situations is also moving in subtle ways toward a
national security or quasi-military norm"). But see MISKEL, supra note 13, at 39-56
(detailing the history of military involvement in emergency response and outlining the
positive contributions of this model).
153 Some organizations have been eager to push the linkage between emergency
management and public health at the state level. See State Strategies for Fully Integrating
Public Health into Homeland Security, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES (Nov. 27, 2005)
(advocating incorporation of public health into the state homeland security governance
structure). On the issue of collaboration between public health and law enforcement, see
Jay C. Butler et al., Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New
Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response, 8 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1152, 1154-55 (2002) (detailing collaboration issues that arose
during the anthrax investigation in 2001); Victor W. Sidel et al., Good Intentions and the
Road to Bioterrorism Preparedness, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 716, 717 (2001) (finding
such cooperation to be "destructive to public health efforts").
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provided to incentivize resource and personnel sharing only apply to
government officials. 15 4
B. "New Governance" Models
1. Understanding New Governance Models
A second category of governance theories explicitly
recontextualizes governance as a multiparticipant endeavor, with
governmental and nongovernmental actors sharing responsibility and
influence.15 5  These theories, collectively referred to as "New
Governance" models, identify more decentralized approaches to
156governance that are more participatory, adaptable, and reflexive.
New Governance models emphasize ideas based on flexible,
collaborative partnerships rather than established top-down, rights-
based strategies integral to traditional governance models. 5 7 "New"
does not mean contemporary; rather it refers to the "widespread and
explicit use of nonconventional forms of governing."' 5 8  New
Governance models have been applied in practice primarily to areas
of administrative and environmental law and have had a strong
influence on understanding modern regulation in both the United
Statesl59 and the European Union.160
154 See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong.
(1996).
155 See, e.g., Black, Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, supra note 21, at 140 (identifying
five central notions of decentered regulation: complexity, fragmentation,
interdependencies, ungovernability, and rejection of a clear public/private distinction);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1, 4-7 (1997); Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 349, 352-55 (2008) (examining the normative argument for legal pluralism
in regulation).
156 See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE 1, 1-
14 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Lobel, supra note 18, at 344.
157 Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324-25
(2009).
15 Trubek, supra note 34, at 147-48.
159 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 18, at 344 (summarizing New Governance approaches
in the United States); Salamon, supra note 156, at 1-14 (defining the New Governance
paradigm).
160 See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLuM. 3. EUR. L. 539, 544-48
(2006). New Governance theories have been influential in the European Union. For
example, under the terms of the EU Treaty there are "common objectives to 'ensure
sustained convergence of the economic performances of Member States."' Caroline de la
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Conceptually, New Governance incorporates and overlaps with
strands of other legal theories including negotiated governance, legal
pragmatism, and democratic experimentalism. New Governance
models encompass a wide range of methods and policy
alternatives. 1 62 Some of these models focus primarily on distributing
control to entities other than the government, through methods such
as public/private partnerships, negotiated rulemaking, audited self-
regulation, and performance-based rules.163 Other approaches under
these models hinge on moving governance away from the centralized
government decision maker through decentralized and dynamic
problem solving. 64 Still other models seek to expand participation
and transparency through disclosure regimes and coordinated
information collection.16 New Governance scholarship further
emphasizes such tenets as the collaborative process and a "flexible
policy [of] formation, implementation, and monitoring."166 The
common characteristics of these methods center on their intent to
bring nongovernmental actors into the governance process to
encourage power sharing, broader dialogue, and ultimately better
Porte & Philippe Pochet, Social Benchmarking, Policy Making and New Governance in
the EU, 11 J. EuR. SOC. POL'Y 291, 295 (2001). The Open Method of Communication
("OMC") is intended to include all relevant stakeholders, such as the Union, the member
states, and social partners. Id. at 292-93. The OMC is a form of New Governance because
it relies on peer pressure as a means of enforcement: benchmarking to compare "how an
organization is doing relative to its peers." Id. at 292; see also Grainne De Biirca & Joanne
Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE Us 1, 1-14 (Grainne De Birca & Joanne Scott, eds.,
2006) (assessing the expansion of New Governance theories).
161 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note
119, at 314-23 (1998) (developing a theory of democratic experimentalism based on
decentralization of government and the development of information pooling,
public/private coordination, and mutual learning); Solomon, supra note 114, at 821-37
(reviewing the New Governance literature); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist
Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & Soc'Y 296, 312-20 (2000) (outlining a non-
essentialist theory of legal pluralism).
162 Some commentators view New Governance as a cohesive paradigm, which
incorporates emerging trends in legal thinking about constitutional and administrative law,
jurisprudence, and democratic theory. See Lobel, supra note 18, at 345-48. Others have
described New Governance as a collection of disparate approaches with a similar
conceptual grounding. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REv. 471, 478-79 (2004).
163 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 345.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 NeJaime, supra note 157, at 332 (the author outlines five general tenets of New
Governance theory by referencing work by other scholars).
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governance outcomes. Supporters of these approaches hail their
democratizing effects,167 but critics have noted that New Governance
models may actually permit more consolidation of influence by
sophisticated participants in the process.
New Governance models vary in scope and content, but they
generally are more decentralized than traditional conceptions of
governance and may involve numerous disparate actors from the
public and private sectors in collaborative engagement and
discourse.169 Thus, these models exist conceptually between
traditional command-and-control models and models that support
more radical deregulation and privatization of governance functions.
As a consequence, the available methods and tools of governance
under this approach are more varied and the possibilities for
innovation more plentiful. New Governance models also tend to be
less oriented towards government control. By distributing authority
within the governance structure, these models change the power
dynamics in the relationship between public and private actors. New
Governance offers the potential, therefore, for the pluralization of
laws and systems, governance methodologies, and the actors and
institutions involved in governance.
Much of the recent interest in New Governance models is framed
as a critique of so-called "traditional" models of governance.i1e Key
to these critiques is an underlying assumption that government has
failed to deliver on its regulatory promises either because of poor
execution or because the complexity of modern society has made
successful regulation impossible. 17 These persistent critiques have
provided fertile ground for alternative governance theories that
feature less governmental control and less centralization in
governance design. But these variables can be configured in many
167 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 405-06 (Table 2 notes the beneficial adjustments of
moving from regulation to New Governance models).
168 See Karkkainen, supra note 162, at 486 (challenging Table 2 of Lobel directly); id.
at 480 (noting the broad debates among scholars as to the nature of New Governance and
its successes).
169 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 18, at 372-76 (describing partnership and participation
in New Governance theory); Salamon, supra note 156, at 14-15 (noting changes in
governance participants).
170 Lobel, supra note 18, at 377 ("[Tlhe regulatory model promotes adversarial
relations, mutual distrust, and conflict.").
171 Salamon, supra note 156, at 6-9 (outlining the need for a New Governance
paradigm).
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ways. Strongly decentralized governance may still be within the
control of government power, and models with substantial power-
sharing between government and nongovernment entities may still
operate in a centralized infrastructure. The ability to apply these
variables with such variety and flexibility demonstrates the
opportunities available when considering New Governance
approaches to a specific system. Figure 3 depicts New Governance
models along the continua of government control and centralization.
Figure 3: New Governance models
Less control More control
Self- regulation Public-private Public-
power sharing private
partnerships
Less centralization More centralization
Nodal governance Multiple Federal
systems operating coordination of
simultaneously public-private
response
2. New Governance Models and Public Health Emergencies
An examination of New Governance methodologies reveals that
principles associated with New Governance have been incorporated
into various aspects of existing public health emergency response
systems. New Governance approaches often coexist with, traditional
governance approaches. Nevertheless, these developments often go
unrecognized as alternative approaches for fostering systemic
resiliency during public health emergencies.
New Governance models have been used in limited, but important,
ways within the emergency preparedness and response system.
Emergency response plans, such as NRF and NIMS at the federal
level, have incorporated some New Governance models into their
frameworks, consequently giving nongovernmental entities a greater
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voice in emergency planning and response.17 2 Moreover, the use of
New Governance models in public health emergency response has
expanded in recent years, often in reaction to the inflexibility and
inconsistency of traditional governance models. For example, in the
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina debacle, commentators criticized
both the command-and-control structure of the NRP and the
implementation of the plan. 73  Federal authorities subsequently
revised the 'NRF and NIMS to provide a more flexible
infrastructure. 1 74 Interestingly, despite its claim to address criticism
that its previous iteration was "insufficiently national in its focus,"
the revised NRF explicitly reduces hierarchy in its system,
eliminating the need for a federal level declaration of an "Incident of
National Significance" to trigger the framework.17 5 The revised NRF
further includes information about the role of nongovernmental
organizations and private sector entities in emergency response
efforts.176
A number of New Governance principles have been utilized in
efforts to govern public health emergencies.' 7 7 Fostering inclusive
partnerships, participation, and collaboration are central to the New
Governance model. These ideas have a long informal history in
emergency preparedness and response. New Governance emphasizes
the power of "non-governmental stakeholders to formulate . . . [new]
goals and directives that [will] shape regulatory reform."' More
specifically, this means structuring systems to allow for greater
collaboration between public and private entities in the planning,
response, mitigation, and recovery phases of emergency response.
172 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 6-7; NRF, supra note 63, at 8-12.
173 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 52-54; see generally Ryan, supra note I1
(critiquing the federalism constraints that undermined'the Hurricane Katrina response).
174 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 6-7; NRF, supra note 63, at 8-12.
175 NRF, supra note 63, at 2, 8.
176 NRF, supra note 63, at 6-7, 18-2 1.
177 Professor Orly Lobel, in her detailed theoretical discussion of New Governance
theory, identifies eight organizing principles of New Governance: (1) participation and
partnership; (2) collaboration; (3) diversity and competition; (4) decentralization and
subsidiarity; (5) integration of policy domains; (6) flexibility and noncoerciveness; (7)
fallibility, adaptability, and dynamic learning; and (8) law as competence and
orchestration. Lobel, supra note 18, at 371-404 (discussing these principles of New
Governance in detail).
178 Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From
Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117,
120 (2009) (analyzing New Governance literature in the context of Chicago's urban
housing reform process).
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While "[t]raditional governance has been skeptical of collaborations
between private and public entities," New Governance models tout
several advantages of public/private collaboration.17 9 Collaboration
goes a step beyond participation and seeks to include individuals as
"norm-generating subjects" within the governance infrastructure.1 8 0
In other words, this approach allows nongovernmental entities like
private health institutions, volunteers, nonprofit organizations, and
civil society groups to have direct and indirect input into planning,
goal setting, and even perhaps the functional response efforts in a
coordinated way.
The principles of diversity, competition, decentralization, and
subsidiarityis have relevance to public health emergencies as well.
Concepts of diversity and competition have a minor role in the
contracting process for certain emergency services, but when it comes
to emergency res ?onse, government plans specifically avoid
competing efforts."s Yet it is clear from the results of some recent
emergency responses (in particular the Hurricane Katrina response
due to its large impact) that a diverse contingent of responders,
including medical volunteers in some cases, is needed. Finding
appropriate personnel requires drawing on available expertise from
across a variety of communities and from members of the private
sector.
Until recently, explicit efforts to include nongovernmental actors in
planning efforts were rare.184 The Stafford Act does not incorporate
nongovernmental entities into emergency response activities despite
the fact that much of the health infrastructure in the United States is
privately owned and operated. Under current federal and state law,
179 Trubek, supra note 34, at 148; see also Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1633-34
(2001).
Iso Lobel, supra note 18, at 377.
181 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 379-82. Subsidiarity is the concept that governance
should take place at the lowest jurisdictional level possible before higher-level
mechanisms are involved. See id. at 382.
182 The MSEHPA adopts language that would allow states to use emergency powers to
suspend regulations for conducting state business that would delay necessary action,
including requirements for competitive bidding for state purchases. See MSEHPA, supra
note 36, art. IV, § 402.
183 Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 13-14.
184 But see Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5134, 5143, 5152, 5170(b) (2006) (showing the inclusion of American Red Cross's role
in emergency response).
185 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 173 (2010).
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governments are permitted to contract with nongovernmental entities
to provide services during an emergency.' 8 6 This approach allows for
participation, but is rooted in traditional governance since the
government is merely delegating a responsibility to the contractee.
More meaningful examples of participation, partnership, and
collaboration are found in the NRF and NIMS, as well as in some
state emergency legislation. These documents encourage outside
actors to participate directly in planning and preparedness,1 which
can allow for meaningful input into governance decisions. Partnership
and participation by nongovernmental actors is more limited,
however, during the course of an actual emergency, when formal
government response predominates.1 88
The role of the American Red Cross during emergencies represents
the most well-established public/private partnership in the United
States emergency response system. Although the American Red Cross
is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that does not receive
regular federal funding, it nevertheless is designated as a primary
organization to coordinate mass care resources under Emergency
Support Function (ESF) #6 of the NRF. 1 89 The close relationship
between FEMA and the American Red Cross in carrying out this
component of the NRF provides a strong example of a New
Governance approach. FEMA is authorized to coordinate with other
nonprofit entities under ESF #6, but these efforts have progressed
more slowly than many had hoped after the coordination and capacity
shortfall during the Hurricane Katrina response.'90
Efforts to expand the health workforce have generated three
notable examples of public/private coordination during the response
phase of public health emergencies: the Emergency System for
186 See, e.g., Michigan Emergency Management Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
30.401-.421 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (allowing for any action to be
taken that is necessary to cope with an emergency); MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. II, §§
201-202 (containing no provision limiting the ability of states to contract with
nongovernment service providers); NRF, supra note 63, at 30 (noting the importance and
necessity of nongovernment contracting).
187 MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. II, § 201.
188 See MSEHPA, supra note 38, art. IV, § 403 (implementing emergency powers that
give the state public health authority primary jurisdiction for planning and coordination of
response activities).
189 NRF, supra note 63, at 20.
190 Tony Pipa, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, WEATHERING THE STORM: THE ROLE OF LOCAL
NONPROFITS IN THE HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF EFFORT 10 (2006), http://www.ncg.org
/s ncg/assets/dpri/NSPPNonprofitsAndKatrina.pdf.
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Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-
VHP); the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC); and the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). In effect, all three of
these examples take a hybrid approach that combines the efforts of
public and private actors, as well as coupling decentralized
governance with centralized coordination-and legal support-during
191
an emergency.
The ESAR-VHP initiative was established by state and federal
governments to explicitly recruit potential medical volunteers for
deployment during public health emergencies in order to fill the need
for additional qualified medical personnel.192 ESAR-VHP directly
reaches out to private sector volunteers and uses a variety of legal
mechanisms to protect deployed volunteers from the legal
ramifications of their service, including liability protection and
workers compensation coverage.' 93 This system effectively marshals
New Governance principles of collaboration, diversity, and
decentralization to construct a useful response methodology within
the larger infrastructure of the government response. Initially
conceived at the state level, these systems have now been
incorporated into the federal system. While -both federal and state
governments have made efforts to coordinate volunteer health
professionals through the ESAR-VHP system, the participants in the
system remain diverse in their training, skills, and employment. 1 94
Moreover, volunteers are decentralized in their location and
professional affiliation, and their participation is voluntary.195
The MRC began as a local volunteer medical services corps, also
designed to assist during an emergency.196 This program exhibits an
unusual combination of hierarchical and decentralized traits. Each
MRC unit is based in a local community, draws its members from that
community, and recruits whatever variety of experts and skills local
191 Interestingly, the latest version of NIMS attempts this hybrid approach as well,
citing its two key concepts as flexibility and standardization. See NIMS, supra note 63, at
6-7.
192 See HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS-LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 9-10 (2006).
193 Id. at 44, 53-54.
194 Id. at 14.
195 Id.
196 OFFICE OF THE CIVILIAN VOLUNTEER MED. RESERVE CORP., REPORT ON THE
MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS RESPONSE TO THE HIN1 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 1 (2009)
[hereinafter MRC].
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participants deem relevant.1 97 Unlike the ESAR-VHP program,
however, participants in the MRC are expected to undergo training
exercises.198 In the event of an emergency, the MRC units can be
deployed and coordinated by the federal government and receive
federal legal protections.1 99 Therefore, the MRC combines aspects of
traditional governance (a military-like hierarchy and federal
coordination) and New Governance (decentralized recruitment,
community-based and initiated organization, and diversity of
personnel). MRC units performed successfully in many jurisdictions
during the 2009 and 2010 influenza outbreak, coordinating mass
vaccination clinics and other outreach programs in several
jurisdictions.200
In limited circumstances, New Governance models can emanate
from the infrastructure of traditional governance models, creatively
improvising new pathways to achieve public/private collaboration in
governance. During Hurricane Katrina, several states were frustrated
201by the limitations of EMAC in facilitating resource sharing.
Numerous private sector healthcare personnel sought to volunteer by
202
assisting in the hardest hit areas in Louisiana. States trying to
coordinate assistance through EMAC were prevented by the design of
the Compact from including volunteers that were not state employees
because EMAC follows a traditional governance model that only
permits sharing of state resources and personnel, and only applies
legal protections to state officials. Maryland ingeniously
circumvented this limitation in its delegation to Louisiana by
temporarily deputizing private health care volunteers as members of
the state guard, thereby granting them the status of state officials for
204the duration of their assistance. These ad hoc expansions of
EMAC, while effective, may not provide a good governance model
197 Id. at 5.
198 Id. at 6.
199 About the Medical Reserve Corps, MED. RES. CORPS (Aug. 8, 2012, 9:12 AM),
https://medicalreservecorps.gov/pageViewFldr/About.
200 MRC, supra note 196, at 7.
201 William L. Waugh, Jr., EMAC, Katrina, and the Governors of Louisiana and
Mississippi, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. (ISSUE SUPP.) 107, 108 (2007).
202 Id.
203 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. (1996).
204 Richard Colgan et al., Operation Lifeline: Health Care Professionals from
Maryland Respond to Hurricane Katrina, ST. DEF. FORCE J., Spring 2006, at 9, 9-12,
available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496627.
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going forward, since this approach creates uncertainty and could deter
volunteer preparation.
C Diffuse Governance Models
1. Understanding Diffuse Governance Models
A third category of governance theories, grouped together as
diffuse governance models, share the impetus with New Governance
to move away from the hierarchy of traditional governance and
conceptualize governance as a multiparty endeavor. However, these
theories go even further from the government-centered status quo and
suggest models of governance that radically devolve and decentralize
governance authority and activity. These models may flatten power
differentials and democratize participation in governance through the
rejection of hierarchy, centralization, and power concentration.
Diffuse governance models encompass several different theoretical
understandings of how governance occurs or could occur. The most
promising of these models has applied network theory to develop the
concept of nodal governance, which recognizes multiple "nodes"
throughout society as capable, although often uncoordinated, agents
of governance. Other scholars have adapted Michel Foucault's
206theory of governmentality to apply to governance.
Governmentality posits that governance is achieved through the
exercise of power by any number of participants in society, and not
necessarily constrained to the actions of sovereign government
207
actors. This idea eliminates government hierarchy as the essential
nexus of power for governance, and thereby presents a complex social
model of interconnected power relationships. A third model of diffuse
governance envisions anarchic governance, with multiple actors
engaged in governance without coordination or predictability.2 0 s
205 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 33.
206 See Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (describing a
model of reflexive law that accounts for other social institutions); Burris, Changes in
Governance, supra note 19, at 8 n.10 (providing background on the evolution of
conception of governance); Hunter, supra note 32, at 118-20 (applying governmentality
theory to public health).
207 See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOvERNMENTALITY 87, 87-104 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT].
208 David Fidler, A Theory of Open-Source Anarchy, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
259, 282 (2008).
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Diffuse governance models propose a more radical break from
traditional governance models, decoupling the inherent connection
between governance and formal government. Given their embrace of
innovative methodologies and reflexive understandings of legal and
social systems, these governance approaches might legitimately be
categorized as a subset of the New Governance theories. However,
unlike New Governance models, which attempt to coordinate and
systematize the relationships between public and private actors,
diffuse governance models allow a greater degree of independence
among participants in governance. Even where some amount of
coordination among governance participants does occur, it may not
use formal systems or government-moderated mechanisms. Thus,
these conceptions of governance exhibit even less direct government
control, hierarchy, and centralization.
Networks and nodes. Nodal governance is a version of network
theory where governance occurs at different points, or nodes, in a
network.209 Building on the twin foundations of network theory and
governmentality, nodal governance recognizes that a plethora of
independent actors across government and civil society participate in
governance, from government officials, to nonprofit organizations, to
private health care facilities, to religious organizations. This model
further situates the nexus of governance at a localized level. The
"nodes" of governance have four characteristics: 1) an institutional
structure, 2) mentalities or ways of thinking about governance, 3)
technologies or methods of influencing events, and 4) resources to
support the node and exert influence.210 These nodes interact with
each other to form a network and to share information. Nodal
governance emphasizes the way in which governance is directed
towards a community.211 Information networks within a community
produce an Outcome Generating System (OGS). This OGS is
influenced by factors both within the "collectivity's control" and by
factors at a higher level of social organization.212 By focusing on the
localized context of nodes, new and innovative efforts at governance
can be tried, "fostering institutions of microgovernance." 2 1
209 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 33.
210 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 341.
211 See Burris, Nodal Governance, supra note 35, at 40.
212 Id. at 36.
213 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 348.
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Governmentality. Many methods of diffuse governance are
informed by Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality. The idea
of govermmentality proposes a much different conception of the social
214
understanding of governance. Rather than gaining legitimacy based
on the hierarchical position of sovereign government, Foucault sees
governance as a process that occurs throughout all levels of society
and that pervades the actions of individuals and institutions alike.2 15
This broadens the concept of governance and delinks it from
government actors. In essence, governmentality theory goes further in
pluralizing governance than some of the New Governance theories,
since rather than gaining the ability to govern through an act of
government-instigated inclusion or deregulation, nongovernmental
actors under Foucault's model already participate in governance.
Likewise, the methods of governance under this approach are more
indirect, with the norms and rules established by various governing
216
entities translated into outcomes. Government actors certainly still
participate in governance under this model, but they are joined by a
multiplicity of other potential participants in governance from
217throughout society.
Anarchic governance. Within a complex social system, diffuse
governance can also be characterized as anarchic, with multiple actors
and systems intersecting in unpredictable and uncontrollable ways. In
many settings, the command-and-control model of governance is
being challenged by the fact that other nongovernmental institutions
and organizations, and new entities in the arena, are more successfully
wielding power and influencing health policy than the traditional
players.2 ' Anarchic governance can have the effect of weakening
formal governance institutions. For instance, some global health
scholars have observed that the World Health Organization is
"waning" in the shadow of the wealthier Gates Foundation in the
arena of global health.2 19
The tensions caused under anarchic governance conditions may
threaten the coherency of governance and preclude some actors in the
system from achieving their governance goals, as these goals are co-
opted and undermined by other actors. Professor David Fidler has
214 See THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 207, at 103.
215 See id.
216 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 103.
217 See THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 207, at 102-03.
218 See Burris, Changes in Governance, supra note 19, at 37.
219 Id.
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coined the phrase "open-source anarchy" to describe a version of this
problem where there is "an elastic relationship between power and
ideas in which non-State actors directly participate, thus affecting, in
various ways, how anarchy operates." 2 2 0 Focusing on the rapidly
evolving global health system governed in part by multiple
international institutions, governments, nongovernmental
organizations, and funders, Professor Fidler suggests that open-source
governance may not work in centralized and rationalized global
221governance systems due to the elasticity of power and ideas. States
and nongovernmental organizations are sensitive to the changes in
power relations, which would possibly produce "heighten[ed]
suspicions of the machinations behind proposals and fears of the
consequences of significant change." 2 2 2 Figure 4 depicts diffuse
governance models along the continua of government control and
centralization.
Figure 4: Diffuse governance models
Less control More control
Anarchic Nodal Governmentality
governance governance
Less centralization More centralization
Nodal governance Nodal governance
without coordination with explicit
coordination
220 Fidler, supra note 208, at 282.
221 Id. at 283.
222 Id. (Fidler goes on to state that open-source anarchy might not work in a global
governance system as such, and "[tiherefore, serious motivation to accept bold governance
innovations may be lacking").
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2. Diffuse Governance Models and Public Health Emergencies
The nodal governance approach can help explain some of the
disparate actions and interactions by actors and institutions involved
in emergency response. Since nodes are broadly defined, they may be
government officials or institutions operating at the local level (e.g.,
local health officers or FEMA representatives working on-site);
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross,
religious organizations, volunteers); or private businesses (e.g.,
hospitals, pharmacies, supermarkets). The flexibility and complexity
of this model incorporates many actors that influence circumstances
during public health emergencies but may not fit within the more
formal understandings of governance. The exertion of influence on
the system by respective nodes may be complementary or
contradictory. For instance, both the federal government and BP were
important nodes of governance during the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, but their interests in how to respond
sometimes clashed, leading to a protracted period of response and
cleanup where the lines of authority were blurred.2 23 Further, nodes
can exert influence through formal mechanisms such as legal powers
or through less formal means. For example, the issuance of a press
release by the World Health Organization imposing a travel ban on
Toronto during the SARS outbreak in 2003 had a strong governance
effect on perceptions and behaviors of the population in ways that
may have affected health outcomes.224
Nodal governance models help to explain the governance
contribution during the Hurricane Katrina response of independent
actors whose actions greatly impacted health. When a number of
hospitals in Louisiana flooded and lost power in the immediate
aftermath of the storm and flooding, patients and caregivers were
stranded without sufficient resources.225 Evacuations proceeded
slowly, however, as many boats and helicopters were engaged
elsewhere.226 The two hospitals that had success in achieving rapid
evacuations were the Veterans Affairs Medical Center and Tulane
223 See Osofsky, supra note 6, at 1105-06 (discussing the many fragmented and
overlapping legal regimes involved in the BP oil spill and in the various aspects of the
recovery process).
224 See Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 339.
225 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Erin Fuse Brown, Assessing Liability for Health Care
Entities that Insufticiently Prepare for Catastrophic Emergencies, 306 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
308, 308 (2011).
226 Id.
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University Hospital.227 The VA Medical Center received assistance
from the National Guard, while Tulane was evacuated using
228helicopters rented by its parent company, HCA. Other public and
private hospitals had even more difficulty evacuating patients and
many died.229 The difference between those who received help
quickly and those who did not was a function of the governance
actions of these distinct nodes. In addition, other private companies
such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and several national chain
pharmacies, were integral in providing supplies to members of the
affected populations.23
Governmentality theory and anarchic governance also can help to
explain some aspects of public health emergency response.
Governmentality theory can be applied to the governance of public
health emergencies to explain certain types of policy options. Efforts
to implement "modern quarantine"-a series of proposals that seek to
implement voluntary self-quarantine and other social distancing
measures-exhibit aspects of governmentality since these proposals
rely on social norms and obligations rather than formal legal orders to
enforce quarantine requests.231 This type of analysis could
conceivably be applied to a wider set of public health emergency
227 See Ian L. Taylor, Hurricane Katrina's Impact on Tulane's Teaching Hospitals, 118
TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS'N 69, 72-75 (2007) (describing
the evacuation of patients at Tulane Hospital and VA Medical Center).
228 Id.
229 Memorial Medical Center, a hospital run by Tenet Health System, faced liability for
their failure to prepare for a foreseeable emergency. See Susanne Pagano, Tenet Reaches
Settlement Over Deaths at New Orleans Hospital Following Hurricane, BLOOMBERG
LAW: HEALTH PLANS (Apr. 8, 2011) (discussing Preston v. Tenet Health System Memorial
Medical Center Inc.); Hodge & Brown, supra note 225, at 309.
230 See STEVEN HORWITZ, MERCATUS CTR.: GEORGE MASON UNIV., MAKING
HURRICANE RESPONSE MORE EFFECTIVE: LESSONS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE
COAST GUARD DURING KATRINA 2-7 (2008) (describing the contributions of private
sector entities in response to Hurricane Katrina); Michael D. Hogue et al., The
Nontraditional Role of Pharmacists After Hurricane Katrina: Process Description and
Lessons Learned, PUB. HEALTH REP., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 218-21 (discussing the novel
roles taken on by pharmacists in response to Hurricane Katrina).
231 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 106-09. This approach was widely employed by the
Canadian government during the SARS outbreak in 2003, and social distancing proposals
figure heavily in plans for pandemic influenza. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Ethical and
Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the
Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3229, 3231 (2003)
(SARS); Lawrence 0. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law,
and the Public's Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 164-68 (2007) (social distancing during
pandemic influenza).
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proposals, including a range of other voluntary agreements and
relationships that exist between government officials and members of
the community.
The perspective offered on pluralism in governance by the anarchic
governance model highlights an important limitation on efforts to
expand notions of governance in the public health emergency setting.
If the multiplicity of actors, methodologies, and intersecting systems
becomes too complex and convoluted, entities with greater power,
influence, resources, or sophistication will reap disproportionate
influence over governance. This may benefit their parochial interests,
rather than the good of society overall. In the context of a public
health emergency, when tensions are already high, care must be taken
to avoid the undue influence of actors who would seek to undermine
the public's health to enrich themselves economically or politically.
III
INTEGRATED PLURALISTIC GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The trio of governance models described above, and their
respective strengths and weaknesses, present an interesting
conundrum for policymakers seeking to improve the effectiveness and
reliability of public health emergency response. Which of these
models is best suited to effective emergency governance? Which of
these models should be used, strengthened, and prioritized to reliably
achieve good health outcomes during public health emergency
responses? These questions are difficult to answer because public
health emergencies vary significantly in scope, causes, and effects.
The overwhelming consensus among most policymakers and scholars
who have tried to answer these questions, not surprisingly, gravitates
to traditional command-and-control governance models.23 Indeed,
emergency planners and lawmakers should not forsake the obvious
efficiencies of a centralized system when responding to a public
health emergency, nor should they jettison a model that has been
232 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 11, at 18-65 (assessing the
successes and failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and providing recommendations
for improvement); LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 51-82 (providing a list of lessons
learned from the Hurricane Katrina response and suggesting improvements to the federal
system); Ryan, supra note 11, at 522-39 (describing the impact of federalism on the
Hurricane Katrina response).
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233
effective in responding to many recent public health emergencies.
However, the success of emergency response efforts should not rely
too extensively on the proper functioning of a system so reliant on
chains of command and official decision making. When emergency
response mechanisms fail or degenerate into bureaucratic limbo, as
occurred during Hurricane Katrina, there ought to be alternative
governance choices to ensure that public health emergency responses
do not falter.
The sections that follow offer an innovative proposal to address
this problem in the form of an integrated pluralistic governance
strategy. Integrated pluralistic governance combines all three
governance models; identifies and supports their most useful
attributes; and uses strategies of concurrency, coordination, and
redundancy between the models to create a more effective and
resilient public health emergency response system.
A. Understanding Integrated Pluralistic Governance
Integrated pluralistic governance is grounded on the idea that the
development and application of parallel and concurrently functional
governance models is essential for maintaining an effective public
health emergency response. Necessarily, and by design, an integrated
pluralistic governance strategy incorporates redundant legal,
structural, and operational capacities, as well as mechanisms to foster
coordination, participation, and adaption. If successfully applied,
integrated pluralistic governance approaches may improve the
resilience and functioning of the public health emergency response
system and advance the goal of achieving better health outcomes
during public health emergencies.
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy has three key
advantages in this context compared with relying on a single
governance strategy: structural adaptability, enhanced capacity, and
redundancy.
First, integrated pluralistic governance approaches allow for
strategic modification of the public health emergency response system
to select the most effectual aspects of each model of governance. All
233 See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-06-32, FEMA'S
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER-AN UPDATE 4-6 (Sept. 2010),
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG-10-123-SeplO.pdf (detailing the many annual
disasters and emergencies that involve FEMA responses).
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three governance models outlined in this Article offer workable
approaches to governance in the context of public health emergencies.
Current approaches to public health emergency response coexist
across all three models of ovemance, as the examples provided
above amply demonstrate. Additionally, the three models have
identifiable-and distinct-strengths and weaknesses in their
application to public health emergencies. Traditional governance
models may be preferable to achieve efficiency, operational clarity,
and coordination, while New Governance models or diffuse
governance models may better advance notions of participation,
flexibility, and adaptation. An integrated pluralistic governance
strategy can prioritize the strengths and compensate for the
weaknesses of each model by implementing the models
235
concurrently.
Second, the implementation of an integrated pluralistic governance
strategy can enhance the capacity of the overall system to respond by
providing additional support for multisectoral development of
expertise and accrual of skills and resources. Different governance
models focus on the functioning of different aspects of public health
emergency response and can be used to bolster capacity building
across the spectrum of governance participants. For example,
traditional governance models can strengthen and refine the actions of
governmental officials at all jurisdictional levels. Numerous
emergency preparedness initiatives over the past decade have pursued
236this goal, with mixed success. New Governance models and diffuse
governance models, by contrast, have potential for expanding system
response capacity in the nongovernmental sector. Establishing an
emergency response system that has functional capacity at all levels
of government and across both the public and private sectors would
provide a more robust infrastructure at all of these levels, and increase
the possibility that all areas and populations receive needed assistance
in a timely and effective manner. Evidence suggests that substantial
progress has been made in expanding response capacity at the federal
and state government levels, but these gains are subject to political
234 See discussion supra Part III.
235 See infra Part IV.B. (providing a detailed examination of this issue).
236 See Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120
Stat. 2831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 701-811 (2006); MSEHPA, supra note
38; NRF, supra note 63.
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and economic factors that could endanger these advances. 237 To the
extent that better response capacity can be developed according to this
approach, it can also more easily be shared through the coordination
and cooperation of multiple actors.
A third benefit of integrated pluralistic governance involves the
potential of using parallel governance models to create redundancy,
which will allow for emergency response efforts to continue even
when governance failures have occurred within one or more parts of
the system. Thus, the establishment of redundant, parallel governance
infrastructure provides a mechanism to avoid some of the systemic
design and operational failures that have plagued past response
efforts.23 8
This third argument for integrated pluralistic governance is fraught
with complications, because advocating for additional systemic
redundancy in an already complex-and expensive-system can be
difficult to justify and politically contentious.239 Nevertheless, the
crux of the integrated pluralistic governance strategy is to find ways
to increase resilience in the public health emergency response system.
Resilience is defined as "[t]he response[s] to stress at individual,
institutional, and societal levels categorized as the characteristics that
promote successful adaptation to adversity."24 0 Most discussions of
resilience within the emergency preparedness literature are framed in
the context of enhancing community-level resilience, i.e., the ability
of the community and its institutions to withstand the impact of the
emergency and continue to function.241 However, in the broader
237 See FEMA's PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER-AN
UPDATE, supra note 233, at 55 (concluding that FEMA's preparedness has improved
across many parameters).
238 See discussion supra Part II.C.
239 Even funding the existing system can be politically contentious as some members in
Congress have stated their refusal to fund FEMA recovery efforts for Hurricane Irene,
which caused significant damage on the East Coast of the United States in August 2011,
without corresponding budget cuts to offset these expenditures. Carl Hulse, Federal
Austerity Changes Disaster Relief N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/08/3 1/us/politics/31disaster.html?_ r-0.
240 SAMMANTHA L. MAGSINO, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY DISASTER RESILIENCE: WORKSHOP
SUMMARY 2 (2009).
241 See, e.g., TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, READY OR NOT?: PROTECTING THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH FROM DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 80, 96-97 (2008)
[hereinafter TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH] (discussing the importance of community
resilience during public health emergencies and making recommendations to bolster
community resilience).
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context of public health emergency governance, the concept of
resilience can be applied to the systems-legal, medical, and social-
that participate in public health emergency responses themselves.
Resilient systems are adaptable and persist in the face of severe
challenges and can function despite governance failures within the
systems. Redundancy in the application and implementation of
governance models is a tool to achieve this systemic resilience.
B. Assessing, Comparing, and Improving Governance Models
The development of an integrated pluralistic governance strategy
requires that pluralistic governance models be integrated in a way that
maximizes the strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of each
governance model. Public health emergency response systems already
use many mechanisms and tools drawn from the three governance
models previously explained. The discussion that follows assesses the
respective strengths and weaknesses of these models in achieving
successful public health emergency responses and in avoiding
systemic design and operational deficiencies. Furthermore, several
explicit recommendations for strengthening public health emergency
govemance are proposed for each model. Importantly, the systemic
design and operational governance deficiencies that led to system
failures during Hurricane Katrina have only been partly addressed,
and therefore, these governance deficiencies still threaten to
undermine future emergency response efforts and must be resolved.
1. Improving Traditional Governance Models
Traditional governance models prioritize government control and
centralization of governance. The government is the primary-and in
some cases the sole-actor effectuating governance, with other
entities only incidentally involved in governance, if at all. This model
can still be quite complex, due to multiple jurisdictional levels in our
federalist system, multiple relevant actors and agencies, the need to
comply with many applicable legal requirements, and the
implementation of detailed, bureaucratic systems through legal and
policy development. Yet the key parameter in traditional governance
models remains the actions of government. The preponderance of
recommendations coming out of the massively ineffectual Hurricane
Katrina response, focused on changing organization or operations
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within government systems, or shifting the authority or responsibility
242from one government official or department to another.
Traditional governance models comprise the clear consensus for
governing public health emergencies, building upon a wide range of
legal and policy provisions. Despite the widely acknowledged failures
of this model during Hurricane Katrina, many reform proposals urged
law- and policymakers to reinforce or refine traditional models of
governance. For example, commentators proposed strengthening
national powers to enhance federal control through an expanded set of
federal powers available during large-scale emergencies or allocation
243
of greater authority to military over civilian agencies. Many
proposals that sought to preserve state and local preeminence in
emergency response governance nevertheless advanced traditional
governance models to buttress the powers of state and local
244governments to exert control over emergency response.
The strengths of traditional governance models seem to support
this consensus, at least during the response phase of the emergency.
The hierarchy and control inherent in traditional governance models
fits well with the urgent and complex challenges posed by a public
health emergency. Government-centered responses should be more
efficient, coordinated, and predictable, particularly if a substantial
government emergency preparedness infrastructure has been
developed. Government should possess superior expertise and
resources compared with other entities, although in the case of the
supply chain, private entities may have superior capability in some
circumstances. Further, government actions are arguably more
242 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 51-82; HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION
STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 11, at 585-630; PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra
note 4, at 18-65.
243 See, e.g., Harrald, supra note 133, at 261-62, 269-70 (2006) (listing critical success
factors and proposing a balance between organization and structure on one hand and
agility and flexibility on the other); Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer In Chief 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 265, 295 (2007) (recommending emergency federal
commandeering of supplies and personnel to bypass local and state governance); Kent,
supra note 90, at 209-10 ("In times of danger and crisis, citizens need reassurance that
someone is in charge. Citizens take comfort in trained forces leading rescue efforts....
Federalized management of catastrophes would provide a unified command structure prior
to an event's occurrence."); Whitley, supra note 89, at 7 ("Under such a catastrophic
scenario, the federal government, without being asked, must intervene more promptly in
the immediate aftermath of an event.").
244 See MSEHPA, supra note 38; MISKEL, supra note 13, at 123-36 (raising a skeptical
view of increased federal involvement in emergency response governance).
245 See Horwitz, supra note 230, at 2-7.
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accountable than corresponding private sector actions.
Predictability and consistency factor into this equation as well.
Government control and hierarchical infrastructure are likely more
predictable in operation than less centralized response systems, and
the established infrastructure of traditional models forms a determined
status quo for emergency response. Finally, law can control and shape
government actions more readily than nongovernmental actions,
therefore giving the law more control over the operation of traditional
governance models.
The traditional model has clear weaknesses as well. Proposals to
strengthen hierarchy, augment government control, and increase
centralization in public health emergency governance will not
necessarily resolve the systemic design and operational failures that
undermined the Hurricane Katrina response, and could even worsen
247these problems. Linear and centralized systems can be more
susceptible to operational deficiencies, particularly those related to
poor decision making. Government-centric traditional governance
models may be vulnerable to political pressure during an emergency
and political neglect between emergencies, which can lead to the
empowerment of underqualified agency leaders, the degradation of
operational capacity that prevents agencies from mounting an
248
adequate response, or a misguided focus on the wrong threats.
Formal governance structures can have difficulties incorporating
external resources and expertise, as was made frustratingly clear
during the BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010.249
A final concern about traditional governance approaches is their
ubiquity. If society is to rely on this governance model to respond to
challenging and potentially deadly emergencies in a timely way, the
246 Transparency requirements and democratic oversight mechanisms would support
this argument. However, government actors often receive liability protections through
sovereign immunity provisions that do not apply to private sector actors, which may
render government less accountable in some instances.
247 See MISKEL, supra note 13, at 134-36.
248 See PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing how NRCC,
RRCC, and Emergency Response Teams all responded simultaneously to the Katrina
disaster, rather than waiting for direction from the local level, thus causing confusion and
inefficiency); Howitt & Leonard, supra note 45, at 220 (noting that "[iun a crisis, as
actions scales up and becomes more complex, leadership or certain responsibilities may
need to be transferred from those initially in charge to others with different skills and more
resources").
249 See Osofsky, supra note 6, at 1086-87 (noting how local government and sublocal
communities engaged in their own clean-up efforts which at times conflicted with the NCP
efforts).
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system must be able to function even if parts of the system are
overwhelmed or poor decisions are being made within the system that
undermine its functionality.
A few key recommendations may help to resolve some of the
ongoing problems that face traditional governance models in the
context of public health emergency response. Traditional governance
models are best situated to resolve systemic design concerns about
federalism and overlapping authority between agencies. The
uncertainty surrounding roles and authority, which was so debilitating
during Hurricane Katrina, could be addressed through more detailed
planning and greater delineation of hierarchy through clarification of
authorities under the Stafford Act, Pandemic Preparedness and All-
Hazards Response Act, and the NRF. Further, the development of
more sophisticated understandings of federalism could help resolve
confusion.250 To some extent the revisions to the NRF since 2005
have taken good steps to address these issues in delineating more
specific roles for federal and state agencies, designating lead agencies
for specific types of emergencies, and creating a unified command
structure for consistent coordination across multiple jurisdictions.251
Had these proposals been in place during Hurricane Katrina, they
could have eliminated some of the delays and uncertainty among
government decision makers. Ultimately though, the impetus toward
greater hierarchy reflected in these proposals is somewhat
unsatisfactory because it fails to resolve operational problems
instigated by inadequate resources or unsatisfactory decision makers.
Even with clearer understandings in place outlining the allocation of
authority between governments and specific agencies and better
developed planning and hierarchy within the government emergency
response infrastructure, the operation of the system can still fail if
resources are not available or key decision makers perform poorly.
2. Improving New Governance Models
New Governance models move away from the notion that all
governance must be done by government. Rather, multiple
participants from the public and private sectors can and should
participate in governance, both in the planning and development of
250 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 662-65 (proposing better understandings of federalism
in the context of emergency response).
251 NRF, supra note 63, at 15-26.
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governance systems and in the implementation and actualization of
these systems. These models promote a vision of governance that
explicitly brings these multiple parties together and shares power and
responsibility amongst them. Efforts to bring nongovernmental actors
into public health emergency governance, such as the NRF, ESAR-
VHP, and MRC, reflect this approach and expand the governance
252possibilities with increased variation in structure and strategy.
New Governance models have several strengths in the context of
responding to public health emergencies. First and foremost these
models recognize that both governmental and nongovernmental
entities play important roles in response efforts, and coordination of
their respective efforts and capacities can improve outcomes and
253
mitigate harm to health. The inclusion of external perspectives also
may have a democratizing effect on emergency preparedness,
allowing for more entities to play meaningful roles and
simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of response efforts.
The tendency toward decentralization and sharing of authority and
responsibility found in New Governance models may provide some
advantages in the context of public health emergencies as well. The
local-first orientation of the NRF for example is predicated on the
idea that the local community is able to prioritize and apply local
254knowledge. According to New Governance theories, local
individuals and institutions, including the local government,
hypothetically would be the best prepared to handle the safety and
health crises that arise during a public health emergency because they
are the most familiar with the community. The residents would also
rely on knowledge from a variety of local individuals instead of only
national experts. Because New Governance deemphasizes expert
knowledge, health officials might not be given as much respect as
well-established members of the community.2 55
Two additional strengths of New Governance models may be
linked with decentralization, collaboration, and participation:
experimentation and ability to adapt.2 56 Experimentation is tied in
with the concept of devolution because the more local the actor or
252 See discussion supra Part III.B.
253 See Hunter, supra note 32, at 116-18 (discussing the application of New
Governance approaches to broaden participation in administrative governance of public
health).
254 See NeJaime, supra note 157, at 334.
255 Lobel, supra note 18, at 453-57.
256 Trubek, supra note 34, at 148.
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entity the easier it is to experiment with new projects or policies.25 7
The goal of experimentation in the New Governance context is to
constantly provide the best result.258 By experimenting with problem
solving at both the state and local levels, and in both public and
private settings, information can be conveyed to stakeholder
networks.259 These networks include both public entities, such as
government officials, and private parties, such as business
260
purchasers. In planning for a public health emergency,
experimentation would also be key, as new policies, drills, and
backup plans could be tested and put in place in anticipation of an
emergency.
Ability to adapt will be necessary when the emergency is
unforeseen or so extensive that it creates catastrophic consequences.
The capacity of a public health emergency system to adapt and
respond to a new disease or a unique natural disaster that overwhelms
conventional response efforts may be advanced through the collective
efforts of multiple entities working together to put together an
innovative response under the circumstances. The scalability and
flexibility built into NRF and NIMS supports this adaptive
capacity,261 but additional explicit capacity building outside of
government agencies should be strongly supported and incentivized
with financial and technical assistance. State budget cuts have
endangered existing emergency preparedness funding and economic
support should be increased when possible as resources become more
available.2 62
Some of these same aspects of New Governance models can be
viewed as weaknesses in the context of responding to public health
emergencies. Expanding the relevant participants in governance may
complicate efforts to achieve a coordinated and efficient response.
Additionally, decentralization during a public health emergency may
create a serious impediment to effectuating an effective and
257 Id.
258 Id. ("Experimentation can also be seen as continuous quality improvement-
organizations should be constantly experimenting to see what works and what does not.")
(citing Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for
Health Care, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 575, 587 (2002)).
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 NIMS, supra note 63, at 6-7; NRF, supra note 63, at 10.
262 Thirty-three states and Washington, D.C. cut their public health budgets in 2009 and
2010. See TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 241, at 48.
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coordinated response. Decentralized response efforts may face
operational failures if the ability of the local jurisdictions or entities to
handle the emergency response is compromised given the severity of
the circumstances, the limited resources of the community, and the
deleterious effect that the emergency may have already had on
resources and health at the local level. Each of these factors played a
role in undermining the Hurricane Katrina response.263 The ability of
a higher level of government, or a nongovernmental response from
outside the locality, to respond and support the local efforts would
have been necessary to supplement response efforts under these
circumstances.
New Governance critics have suggested that New Governance
models are too idealistic and fail to take into account the reality of
social and political circumstances. New Governance theory is often
stated in vague language that fails to deal with questions of
264implementation. Because New Governance theory purports to be
an overarching regulatory theory it may not always be desirable or
feasible in every situation.26s Another concern is that New
Governance theory does not adequately account for inclusion of
outside roups, particularly those that are already marginalized in
society. Commentators have also raised practical questions about
how to achieve consistency and shared values with a disparate set of
267
actors involved in governance. These concerns are particularly
relevant in the context of public health emergency responses, given
the high risk to the health of the population at stake and the need for
urgency and consistency in response efforts.
Despite these concerns, the potential for additional initiatives using
New Governance models is ripe for exploration. The most significant
impact of New Governance models is most likely to be felt in the
planning stages for public health emergencies, because this planning
263 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 532-36.
264 See Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 323-24 (Grainne De Birca &
Joanne Scott, eds., 2006).
265 Sturm, supra note 264, at 360 (recognizing that while "[g]ovemance techniques as a
strategic response to a particular situation might be uncontroversial, New Governance
presents itself as 'an overarching regulatory theory,' which begs difficult questions about
desirability and feasibility").
266 Id. at 349-50.
267 See NeJaime, supra note 157, at 357 (explaining that most of the New Governance
scholarship fails to address those commitments that "featur[e] diametrically opposed views
and constituencies").
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process can incorporate a more dynamic and intersectoral consultation
process. This consultation process should explicitly include local
perspectives and reach out to underrepresented groups who may be
more vulnerable during public health emergencies.
Additionally, despite adopting a national focus and unified
command structure, the trajectory of changes to NRF and NIMS
suggests a move towards less centralization in response planning, a
development consistent with New Governance models. With the
implementation of NRF and NIMS continuing, private sector and
NGO participants will have additional opportunities to become
involved in planning.270 FEMA should expand and promote this
process, as it likely will yield benefits in participation, training,
capacity building, and acceptance of the norms advanced by NRF.
The National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), a health-focused
preparedness document prepared by the HHS, supports this initiative
as well, with a focus on developing a strong health workforce,
coordinated communication, and collaboration between public and
private sectors on the issue of health during emergencies. Similar
efforts should occur at the state and local levels. These partnerships,
once in place, can form the foundation for more extensive
collaboration in public health emergency response efforts.
268 Lawrence 0. Gostin, The value ofpublic deliberation in public health preparedness,
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2009, at 20, 20; J. Eline Garrett et al., Listen! The Value of Public
Engagement in Pandemic Ethics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2009, 17, 17.
269 Note that one of the key changes in the NRF is the switch from calling it the
"National Response Plan" to the "National Response Framework." NRF, supra note 63, at
2-3. The NRF explains that in its earlier iteration "it was evident that the NRP and its
supporting documents did not constitute a true operational plan in the sense understood by
emergency managers. Its content was inconsistent with the promise of its title." Id. at 2.
The term framework "is now more accurately aligned with its intended purpose" to guide
governmental response at all levels in partnership with the private sector,
nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens. Id. at 3.
270 FEMA's PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER-AN UPDATE,
supra note 233, at 4-6.
271 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5-17 (2009), http://www.phe.gov
/preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter NHSS]; BARAK
OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIvE 8: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness; U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BIENNIAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL
HEALTH SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12-53 (2010),
www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/. . ./nhssbip-draft-100719.pdf [hereinafter Biennial
Plan].
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3. Improving Diffuse Governance Models
Diffuse governance models also seek to expand the number of
participants in governance and reduce the reliance on government-
centered hierarchy and control of governance. The main distinction
with diffuse governance models compared with New Governance
models is the extent of coordination and explicit connection involved
between entities involved in governance. Where a New Governance
approach would bring together public and private actors to figure out
a common strategy to respond to a public health emergency (e.g., the
approach taken with the NRF), diffuse governance presumes that
these public and private actors will take steps to govern, but not
272
necessarily as part of a cohesive plan or coordinated process.
Hence, diffuse governance models often lack explicit cohesion, but
may still be complementary in their effects and outcomes and
consistent with the norms advanced by governmental actors.
Critics of diffuse governance models further claim that
decentralization lacks accountability. In addition, decentralized or
regional governance may fail "in the absence of a regional
,,273identity. On the other hand, even when there is state or federal
legislation "forcing top-down regional approaches, . . . resistance to
regionalism can undermine their effectiveness and long-term
viability." 274
The legal and economic deterrents that limit participation of some
nongovernmental entities during public health emergencies can best
be addressed through New Governance or diffuse governance models,
supported by changes to the law to minimize those deterrents. More
state governments could achieve this goal by enacting emergency
response laws or otherwise introducing incentives that allow for
licensure reciprocity for out-of-state health workers, immunity from
liability,. coverage of costs, direct compensation, workers'
272 There is another way to frame the NRF within the rubric of diffuse governance
models. Under this approach the NRF is engaged, in part, in an exercise of coordinated
nodal governance, with many governance participants agreeing to apply specific structural
strategies and normative values to emergency response. There is a distinction between
explicit coordination of nodes, in which the public and private actors agree to adhere to
designated strategies and values, and aspirational coordination of nodes, in which the plan
is available for all to follow-and perhaps even incentivized through legal, social, or
economic means-but not mandatory or directly coordinated.
273 Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 544
(2005).
274 Id. at 544-45.
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compensation, or favorable access to grants or tax incentives.27 5
Expansions of training programs for multiple participants can also
empower disparate nodes in their governance efforts, while
simultaneously advancing standardization and consistency in response
276
as envisioned by NIMS.
The development of NHSS takes the community-based approach
even further, stating that "[n]ational health security is built on a
foundation of community resilience" and seeks to enhance links
between community organizations and individuals to educate, inform,
277
and incentivize preparedness. These types of efforts, based on
diffuse governance models, could greatly increase response capacity
and improve health during a public health emergency. Because their
implementation has just begun, additional development and support
will be vital to the success of these initiatives.
C. Enhancing Resiliency Through Concurrency, Coordination, and
Redundancy
Integrated pluralistic governance offers an additional promising
insight into addressing the problematic issue of operational
governance failures during public health emergency responses. The
recommendations offered in the previous section identify a series of
proposals for enhancing governance of public health emergency
response through each of the three governance models. What these
recommendations do not resolve, however, are the most difficult
questions of how to structure a public health emergency response
system that functions well and reliably avoids systemic design and
operational deficiencies that may lead to governance failures. Trying
to balance efficient and effective response mechanisms, which are
usually tethered to hierarchical -traditional governance models, with
systemic resiliency, adaptability, and innovation, which more closely
align with New Governance models and diffuse governance models,
creates vexing challenges. Developing a system that functions when
faced with predictable operational governance failures-an
overwhelmed system stretched past its capacity or a key decision-
maker not performing well-presents a difficult task. The linear
275 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 65-70
(outlining a number of proposals to incentivize legal protections for volunteer health
professionals during public health emergencies).
276 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 7.
277 BIENNIAL PLAN, supra note 271, at 7, 11-17.
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decision-making infrastructures in place during the Hurricane Katrina
response did not function well when presented with these two types of
governance failures, and none of the three.governance models alone
will resolve these problems without endangering the ability of the
system to effectively coordinate an efficient response.
Integrated pluralistic governance, through its combination of these
three distinct governance models, confronts the problem of
operational governance failures by applying principles of
concurrency, coordination, and redundancy. These are overlapping
concepts, but each is integral to bolstering resiliency under an
integrated pluralistic governance strategy.
Concurrency-the simultaneous use of multiple governance
models-does more than increase functional capacity of the
emergency response system. Through the deployment of disparate
parallel models, concurrency empowers a variety of governance
actors to participate in and have complementary effects on a response
effort. Local hospital capacity, for example, forms an important
resource for protecting health during a public health emergency
278
response. In governance terminology, a private hospital would
form a node of governance under the diffuse governance model. A
concurrent governance structure could utilize the capabilities of the
hospital in tandem with government and other responders with
different, but corresponding, capabilities. 2 7 9 The NHSS adopts two
objectives consistent with this notion, fostering integrated, scalable
health systems, and developing and maintaining the health
workforce.280
Coordination transcends individual governance models in two
respects. Efforts to coordinate different participants involved in public
health emergency governance occur within and across all of the
governance models. Additionally, the process of coordination allows
for participants in different models to work together effectively.
Coordination has particular relevance to New Governance models,
which include coordination as a key principle undergirding
278 Significant effort has been put into hospital preparedness across the country. The
Hospital Preparedness Program, funded by HHS, has provided resources and guidance to
hospitals to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. See CTR. FOR
BIOSECURITY OF UPMC, HOSPITALS RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
OF THE U.S. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND PRIORITIES GOING FORWARD 57-
62 (2009), http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009
-04-16-hppreport.html.
279 NHSS, supra note 271, at 11-12.
280 Id. at 8-12.
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public/private cooperation.281 Coordination can take many forms with
various levels of cohesion and standardization. One coordination
strategy that has been pursued by NIMS and NHSS is to encourage all
282governance participants to adhere to standard norms and plans.
Through standardization of practices, methods, and standards,
different participants in governance may work efficiently and
predictably together even when not directly in communication with
each other. Coordination, however, need not be standardized to have
beneficial impact. The implementation of nonstandardized approaches
by diffuse localized governance participants could be quite useful and
might even be essential in an emergency that defies established
283
planning or requires creative innovation.
Redundancy plays an important role in integrated pluralistic
governance as well. Redundancy ensures that the public health
emergency response does not disintegrate if formal government
systems or the hierarchical emergency response infrastructure fail.
Redundancy is actually a form of concurrency. Whereas concurrent
governance models coexist and include multiple participants with
distinct roles and capabilities, redundancy strives to create coexisting
capacity that explicitly does overlap, in order to ensure that extra
response capacity is available if the typical response strategies do not
succeed. Public health emergency governance plans usually refer to
redundancy in relation to specific logistical systems, like
communications infrastructure, but the pretext of redundancy is found
in many structural aspects of the existing system, including the local-
first orientation of the Stafford Act and the federalism-based
reluctance of the federal government to more assertively manage
emergencies. The redundancy envisioned by integrated pluralistic
governance, however, takes a more extensive approach, by seeking to
establish redundancy across concurrent systems in anticipation that
some components of these systems will fail, especially during
catastrophic events.
The term "redundancy" exudes negative connotations of
bureaucratic inefficiency, wastefulness, and operational confusion.
Often, redundancy has been correctly criticized for complicating and
281 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 385-87 (discussing the use of coordination in the
integration of policy domains).
282 NIMS, supra note 63, at 7; NHSS, supra note 271, at 1, 11.
283 See Howitt & Leonard, supra note 45, at 218 (noting that some types of
emergencies are so enormous that they necessitate adaptation and creativity in response).
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confusing governance systems, including when redundant legal
powers between public health and emergency response agencies
provide conflicting mandates for who is in charge of the response
effort.2 84 Nevertheless, redundancy should not be understood this
way, as it is not inherently a negative concept. Professor Robert
Cover argues persuasively that redundancy in some contexts can lead
to innovation, protect rights, and help improve legal and social
norms.285 While Professor Cover addresses redundancy in the legal
system, his conception of "good redundancy" can be applied to a
multivariate emergency response system. Achieving good redundancy
in the public health emergency response system requires affirmative
efforts to link disparate actors across systems and to foster
harmonization and normative convergence. Harmonization can be
cultivated through the New Governance techniques of coordination,
communication, and participation. Diffuse governance models can
advance good redundancy by providing, multiple nodes to act as
participants in governance, either in coordination with formal
government processes, or in lieu of these processes if the system
falters. Combined with concurrency and coordination, redundancy in
this context provides a powerful path to a more resilient public health
emergency response system.
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy for public health
emergencies would not necessarily be a panacea for dealing with
failures of public health emergency responses. This strategy carries
with it corresponding disadvantages of redundancy, inefficiency, and
286lack of coordination. Yet with careful consideration and significant
effort, these problems too can be minimized.
284 See Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13, at 65-70
(discussing complications with dual declarations of emergency powers and conflicting
agency responsibility for emergency response at the state level); Ryan, supra note 11, at
522-28.
285 See Cover, Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 15, at 642-43 (showing
that jurisdictional redundancy of parallel legal forums leads to better outcomes by
allowing for the creation of new norms and permitting litigants to avoid corrupt judges);
see also Cover, Dialectical Federalism, supra note 15, at 1045-65 (discussing the
potential benefits of redundancy in the multilayered jurisdiction created by habeas corpus
petitions).
286 Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, supra note 18, at 355
("Problems are also a means and a product of the distribution of governance jurisdiction.
Artificial, if not arbitrary, lines of responsibility lead to duplicative, incomplete, and
counterproductive interventions, and sometimes to strange allocational results as resources
are deployed within rationalities bounded by jurisdictional lines.").
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One troubling concern is the potential tension between different
actors within an integrated pluralistic governance strategy. Conflict
between parties within a system has been identified as a tool of New
Governance, but in the context of an emergency response,
competition, and therefore inefficiency and rivalry, are not welcome
287developments. Conflicts in this context ultimately may be
unavoidable in some situations, but they can be forestalled by
planning and transparency, ongoing open communication between
different actors, additional research into the dynamics of the system to
more clearly identify participants in governance and their potential
roles, formal and informal planning sessions and debriefing sessions,
pilot studies of different policy approaches, and development of
expertise at all levels. Having all participants in governan6e-local to
national, public to private to volunteer-agree on standardized
288procedures and norms, as recommended in NIMS and NHSS, Will
eliminate some areas of conflict and help with trust, predictability,
and coordination. An integrated pluralistic governance strategy may
need to impose default rules backed by law that resolve these
tensions. This approach promotes clarity in situations where there is a
disagreement between actors engaged in different aspects of public
health emergency response, but should be circumscribed to avoid
undermining the advantages of the pluralistic governance strategies,
such as reimposing too much rigidity could weaken and undercut the
value of concurrency. A good model for the default approach would
be to adopt the allocations of authority currently outlined in the NRF
and NIMS. 28 9
An equally challenging issue stems from redundancy within the
integrated pluralistic governance strategy. The existence of redundant
capacity-especially capacity developed for a catastrophic emergency
that is likely to be a rare, but devastating, type of event-must be
evaluated in light of the opportunity costs incurred by precluding
other important uses of resources. Critics of emergency preparedness
have challenged the need to expend resources on emergency-specific
systems and instead suggest expenditures for more widely applicable
287 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 379-81.
288 NIMS, supra note 63, at 7; NHSS, supra note 273, at 5-13 (describing the roles,
relationships, and approaches of various participants in the NHSS).
289 See NIMS, supra note 63, at 5-7, 45-74; NRF, supra note 63, at 15-26.
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290public health projects or other interests altogether. Therefore,
policymakers should align emergency preparedness infrastructure
with other useful projects in a synergistic manner. Supplementing
public health and healthcare capacity in local communities, for
example, has population health benefits both during emergencies and
generally.
Successful coordination also will pose a challenge,for an integrated
pluralistic governance strategy. Public health emergencies, by
definition, require a rapid, efficient response. A legitimate concern
regarding this governance approach is that it may destroy the
efficiency needed to successfully respond, needlessly complicate
response efforts, and create problematic and unfair allocations of
resources. Achieving coordination in the midst of an emergency will
be challenging indeed. For this approach to succeed, significant
planning and consensus on response strategies must be developed in
advance to obviate the need for contemporaneous coordination of
some components of the response. For example, if private sector
entities or local government organizations know that they have the
capacity and obligation to provide certain services, or that they will be
compensated if they do so, they may be empowered to act without
explicit permission by centralized decision makers. Admittedly, this
solution is not completely satisfying, as there will be some aspects of
a response, such as how to divide and allocate limited resources that
will require contemporaneous coordination and real time judgment
calls.
Several specific approaches can be pursued to build redundancy
into the public health emergency response system and thereby
augment resilience in this system. First, the emergency response
system should anticipate the possibility of failures at various points in
the system hierarchy and plan for how alternative governance
mechanisms will allow the system to function despite these failings.
Using concurrent governance models, based on participation of
private sector actors and the diffusion of responsibility across these
many nodes of governance, can strengthen systemic resilience. The
NRF, NIMS, and NHSS already support this type of governance
stratification to a limited extent. Changes to the NRF to explicitly
account for response efforts when the unified command structure is
290 See CENTURY FOUND., supra note 81 (recommending a balance between emergency
preparedness funding and other public health necessities).
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not operable would further enable this strategy, perhaps in the form of
a specific annex that addresses this issue in detail.
The successful application of this strategy may require changes to
the law to facilitate more extensive participation of nongovernmental
actors. Precedents such as the ESAR-VHP volunteer program -could
provide lessons to emulate in this area, both in terms of organization
and legal reform.291 Additionally, efforts at public education, social
support, and media cooperation could improve individual and
community resilience in the face of a serious public health
292
emergency. Across all of these efforts, it will be important that
public health emergency preparedness receives sufficient resources to
maintain systemic resilience.
Integrated pluralistic governance should also be utilized to protect
against political favoritism in the allocation of resources or the
prioritization of response activities. Communities with already strong
resources and sophisticated planning and training will have inherent
advantages during a catastrophic emergency. Communities without a
strong resource base, which also may face challenges with health,
education, housing, and transportation infrastructure on an everyday
basis, will likely face even larger risks from a ,.public health
emergency. The devastation of the Lower Ninth Ward in New
Orleans during Hurricane Katrina was the byproduct of numerous
intersecting facets of vulnerability, among them the location of poor
residents in the most at-risk sections of the city for flooding, lack of
information available to residents about flooding risks, and limitations
on the ability of residents to evacuate due to transportation and
293
economic impediments. Beyond these factors, response decisions
often reflect the direct and indirect biases that lead policymakers to
target resources first to more politically powerful or organized
constituencies. Michael Brown, the head of FEMA during the
Hurricane Katrina response, famously said that it took so long to send
federal support to residents sheltering at the New Orleans Superdome
291 See generally Hodge, Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity, supra note 13,
at 65-70.
292 See Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Meeting Report, Community Resilience
Roundtable on the Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21
(HSPD-21); 6 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SC.,
269, 274 (2008); Fran H. Norris et al., Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set
of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness, 41 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 127,
142-46 (2008).
293 See MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 11, at 187-232.
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because they did not know the people were there. In this context,
redundant and parallel governance systems, in conjunction with legal
protections, can counterbalance political favoritism in resource
prioritization if alternative mechanisms of support can reach
295
communities that may be ignored by formal decision makers.
Plans to invest additional resources in emergency preparedness and
response activities likely will face political opposition from opponents
who abhor expenditures on what they see as redundant or unnecessary
projects, as well as those who are wary of public/private collaboration
potentially benefiting private interests at the expense of the public
good. The complicated politics of redundancy may limit the appeal of
the integrated pluralistic governance strategy as a broader national
296
endeavor. But the ongoing development of NRF and NHSS
suggest a modest level of support for these general concepts and
provide a framework upon which to build toward systemic resiliency
for public health emergency response systems. Ultimately, the
widespread, systematic adoption of integrated pluralistic governance
is constrained by political and economic factors. However, less
comprehensive adoption of this approach by selected localities, and
through the expansion of already successful initiatives like ESAR-
VHP and MRC across the country, could move toward a more
integrated and pluralistic governance framework for public health
emergencies.
The integrated pluralistic governance strategy thus retains the best
features of traditional governance models-efficiency, adaptability,
and accountability-and enhances these attributes with a robust
network infrastructure. This approach would be more adaptable and
flexible in its ability to function even if the decisional structure fails.
Most importantly, this approach avoids system failure
294 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 535 (citing Michael Brown's statements on NBC Nightly
News).
295 This notion tracks somewhat Professor Cover's observation that jurisdictional
redundancy in the judicial system can help achieve justice, despite the presence of judges
who explicitly or implicitly exert political favoritism in their rulings. See Cover, Uses of
Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 15, at 660-62.
296 Care must be exercised from a political perspective as well. Ideological opposition
to federal support of emergency response (and to federal government activity in general)
could seize upon this redundant strategy as a pretext for not engaging in government
response efforts, in effect leaving the response to the private sector. This approach would
be ill-advised, inefficient, and beset with conflicts of interest. The protocols for the system
should prioritize levels of response and the roles of different participants, but should
prevent government resources from being withdrawn in favor of private resources unless
those private resources will be more effective in achieving good outcomes.
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disproportionately contingent on the actions of decision makers. Had
an integrated pluralistic governance strategy been in place during
Hurricane Katrina, the dual governance failures at the root of the
unsuccessful response efforts may have been averted as redundancy
and coordination provided alternative mechanisms to facilitate
response. Thus, an integrated pluralistic governance system, through a
combination of notions of concurrency, coordination, and
redundancy, can foster a more resilient public health emergency
response system.
CONCLUSION
An integrated pluralistic governance strategy allows for the
embrace of complex systems and recognizes that multiple governance
models may coexist within these systems. Complex systems do not
afford the luxury of a one-size-fits-all approach to governance,
regulation, or application of law. This realization may seem a bit
disconcerting especially in the context of a public health emergency,
where certainty brings comfort and where propriety demands rapid
reaction and results that are consistent, efficient, and competent. But
the advantages of understanding governance as a complex process-
linked to a series of interlocking systems-are in the ability of an
integrated pluralistic governance strategy to greatly enhance the
resiliency and flexibility of public health emergency response
systems.
Efforts to strengthen and apply governance models concurrently
through integrated pluralistic governance during public health
emergencies could lead to a superior emergency response system that
relies less on impeccable government implementation, clear chains of
command, and centralized control. Supporting a mixture of
concurrent, coordinated, and purposefully redundant governance
strategies can enhance the capacity of the public health emergency
response system to effectively function even when pushed past
normal capacity.
Public health emergency governance should be'reimagined to meet
current and future needs effectively. This will not be an easy exercise.
Emergency preparedness is an inherently complex problem, needing
plans and strategies to avert emergencies from both natural and man-
made threats. Effective preparedness entails the integration of
scientific and medical expertise, good logistical planning, and clear
laws and policies. Coordinating these interdisciplinary considerations
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requires more than just strategic planning; it demands thoughtful
approaches to emergency governance. The governance function has
particular import for public health emergencies because pandemics
and other disasters can have profoundly divisive social and political
consequences.
The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed many concerns about
governance failure during public health emergency responses and
reaffirmed the fact that the laws and plans on the books do not always
translate well to practical implementation. Understanding the
governance aspects of this system may help resolve this nefarious
disconnect. As we contemplate future public health emergency
governance, continued reliance on a model that concentrates authority
and presumes top-down governance should be reassessed. By
reimagining public health emergency governance, we can better
understand the likely outcomes of our legal frameworks and policies
in addressing health, and also devise and construct new systems that
better comport with our goals and values.
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